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ABSTRACT 
 Taxes, User Charges and the Public Finance of College Education. 
 (August 2003) 
Dokoan Kim, B.A., Busan National University; 
M.A., George Washington University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Timothy J. Gronberg 
 
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the relative use of general state 
subsidies (tax finance) and tuition (user charge finance) in the state financing of higher 
education. State universities across U.S. states are very different among themselves 
especially in terms of user charges, public finances, and qualities.  
In this study, we consider only the State Regime in which the state government 
decides the user charge, head tax, and expenditure, taking the minimum ability of 
students as given and the state university simply is treated as a part of government. The 
households who have a child decide to enroll their children at the university, taking head 
tax, tuition, and quality of university as given.  
The two first-order conditions of the state government’s optimization show the 
redistribution condition and provision condition. For a given marginal household, we 
show that under certain conditions, we have an interior solution of both head tax and 
expenditure. In the household equilibrium, the marginal household is determined at the 
 iv 
point where their perceived quality of university is equal to the actual quality of 
university. 
We solve the overall equilibrium, in which the given ability of a marginal household 
for the state government is the same as the ability of the marginal household from the 
households’ equilibrium. Since it is impossible to derive explicit derivation of 
comparative statics, we compute the effects of income, wage differential between college 
graduates and high school graduates, distribution of student ability on head tax, 
expenditure, tuition, tuition/subsidy ratio, and quality of university.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I.1 Introduction 
 
About three quarters of college students in the United States are enrolled in 
state higher education institutions. Funding these institutions is a perennial issue for 
both college-attending households and general taxpayers in the state.  
State universities across the United States are highly differentiated especially 
in terms of user charges, public finances, and qualities. For instance, in 1996, when 
we compare each flagship university across states, the ratio of tuition to the cost of 
education varied significantly across states. The highest ratio, 71 percent, comes 
from state of Vermont, while the lowest ratio, 20 percent, is from the state of 
Florida.1 We try to explain why there exist these cross-sectional differences among 
state universities across states. 
Public universities are much more constrained in tuition and admission policy 
than are private universities. The legal authority to set tuition for public universities 
and colleges varies by state. Even though there are several different organizations 
that have authority to set tuition for public four-year institutions, we can divide these 
groups into two regime types: State Regime and Campus Regime.2 Regardless of 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the American Economic Review. 
1 We view the in-state tuition as a user charge, and state appropriation per student as a subsidy. The 
ratio of user charge to the cost of education is in-state tuition divided by the sum of in-state tuition and 
state appropriation per student. 
2 According to Christal (1997), there are different board systems across states such as Legislature, 
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regime, the state government decides a state appropriation to support higher 
education. In the State Regime, the state government also chooses the tuition, while 
the university decides the tuition in the Campus Regime. For example, we claim that 
Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington, California, New 
York, North Carolina, and Texas belong to the State Regime. 3 To deal with two 
regimes, it is easier to start with the State Regime so that we analyze the mix of 
tuition and tax funding under the institutional arrangement in which the state 
government chooses both tuition and head taxes. 
We consider both tax finance and user charge finance in the model. Every 
household is to pay a common lump sum tax, while those households who send their 
children to the state university pay a user charge. The students enrolled at the 
university enjoy the quality of university, though the benefit of schooling differs as a 
function of the ability of the student. Quality of university in the model is determined 
by the average student quality and per student expenditure. According to Cornes and 
Sandler (1996), a club is defined as a voluntary organization in which the members 
share some of benefits, such as production costs, characteristics of members, and 
excludable benefits. Therefore, a club good is what the club members share 
exclusively. In the public higher education, a club is a public university. The public 
university produces the quality of the university, which gives the benefit, i.e. higher 
future income to those enrolled students. Note that only those who pay the tuition can 
share this quality of university. Therefore, the university quality is a club good.  
                                                                                                                                          
State Coordinating/Governing Agency, System Governing Board, and Institutional/ Local Board. 
3 In six states, the state legislators have constitutional or statutory authority to set tuition. (Colorado, 
Florida, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington). By practice, the legislators in four additional 
states set tuition. (California, New York, North Carolina, Texas) 
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 In the model, the state government is assumed to choose the user charge, 
head tax, and expenditure, taking the minimum ability of students as given. The 
solution requires satisfying a redistribution condition and a provision condition. The 
redistribution condition shows how to redistribute income among the types of 
households. The provision condition identifies the tradeoff the state government 
faces when choosing how much to spend on university quality. This allocation 
problem involves a modified Samuelson condition. The state government problem is 
now to combine the two conditions. For a given marginal household, we show that 
under certain conditions, we have an interior solution of both head tax and 
expenditure.  
The households who have a child decide whether or not to enroll their child. 
In the household equilibrium, their perceived quality of university is equal to the 
actual quality of university. 
We solve for the overall equilibrium, in which the given ability of a marginal 
household for the state government is same as the ability of the marginal household 
from the household equilibrium. We do the comparative statics such as the effect of a 
change in political weight, and in income. Since it is impossible to do more 
comparative statics, we use a simulation method to derive several numerical 
comparative statics result. Using a uniform distribution of students’ abilities, we 
investigate the effect of a change in income, the effect of a change in political weight 
and the effect of a change in college wage differential. Furthermore, we investigate a 
change in distribution function from uniform distribution to beta distribution. 
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I.2 Motivation 
 
It is obvious that education is not a pure public good, because it costs almost 
nothing to exclude the students from schooling. Since the benefit, mostly higher 
wage rate, from higher education belongs primarily to those who are enrolled at the 
university, higher education can be perhaps best classified as a private good. Since 
we are concerned with the public universities, higher education is either a publicly 
provided private good or a publicly financed private good. In case of the publicly 
provided private good, there is no user charge, but exclusive tax finance. In case of 
the publicly financed private good, there is a mix of both user charges and tax 
finance.   
Tax revenues have supported public higher education around the world. For 
U.S. public institutions, state and local government appropriation has been one of the 
main revenue sources, while tuition has been relatively less important.  
In order to establish some broad facts about state differences in the relative share of 
tuition to tax finance, we check the data for state universities. Using Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) for the past 26 years (1981-1996), 
we take a look at between-state differences and within-state differences in tuition, 
subsidy, and tuition/subsidy ratio.4 In Table I, we report the tuition/subsidy ratio 
over the period. The tuition is in-state tuition or resident tuition. Since IPEDS 
provides both the list tuition, and tuition revenue, at first, we calculate total tuition 
and fee revenue divided by the number of the full-time equivalent students as tuition.  
                                                 
4 We try to include as many state universities as possible for the 26 year panel. We have 422 
universities. There are 291 teaching-oriented universities and 131 research-oriented universities in the 
data.   
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Table I. Summary of Tuition/Subsidy Ratio over 26 years 
  Year 81 83 85 86 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
 All Types Gini Index(x100) 31.82 31.85 32.14 31.87 31.42 30.56 29.75 30.20 29.54 28.65 28.70 28.23 27.82 
  Theil Index(x1000) 185.17 174.43 178.78 175.92 175.57 157.76 164.88 155.26 150.81 158.08 147.02 142.40 136.20 
  p90/p10 4.49 4.38 4.33 4.48 4.37 4.61 3.30 4.23 3.83 3.07 3.66 3.42 3.50 
  p75/p25 2.03 2.17 2.06 2.18 2.02 2.07 1.95 2.06 1.96 1.86 1.94 1.97 1.92 
 Theil Index Within States(x1000) 49.08 53.79 50.61 64.39 58.60 45.33 41.73 39.48 41.10 39.45 42.80 41.68 37.46 
  Between States(x1000) 136.09 120.64 128.17 111.53 116.97 112.43 123.15 115.78 109.71 118.63 104.22 100.72 98.74 
  Fraction of Between 73.49 69.16 71.69 63.40 66.62 71.27 74.69 74.57 72.75 75.04 70.89 70.73 72.50 
  Mean 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 
  Standard Deviation 0.21 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.35 
 Teaching-Oriented Gini Index(x100) 31.19 31.33 31.55 31.20 30.54 29.08 28.11 28.26 27.66 27.56 27.03 26.48 26.19 
  Theil Index(x1000) 166.08 172.34 175.51 172.95 172.30 147.37 140.92 141.05 137.53 139.86 136.99 131.37 124.47 
  p90/p10 3.98 4.05 4.06 4.29 4.21 4.09 3.73 3.63 3.30 3.09 2.94 2.90 3.04 
  p75/p25 2.14 2.14 2.12 2.12 2.02 2.02 2.00 1.83 1.77 1.79 1.79 1.76 1.83 
 Theil Index Within States(x1000) 32.81 50.14 46.30 62.36 55.61 37.28 33.79 29.57 31.07 33.10 32.89 32.93 27.51 
  Between States(x1000) 133.27 122.20 129.21 110.59 116.69 110.09 107.13 111.48 106.46 106.76 104.10 98.44 96.96 
  Fraction of Between 80.24 70.91 73.62 63.94 67.72 74.70 76.02 79.04 77.41 76.33 75.99 74.93 77.90 
  Mean 0.34 0.40 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.52 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 
  Standard Deviation 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36 
 Research –
Oriented 
Gini Index(x100) 32.58 32.31 32.78 32.37 32.27 32.86 32.45 32.70 31.85 31.27 31.08 30.81 30.19 
  Theil Index(x1000) 175.14 169.76 178.47 173.99 170.90 175.02 170.91 177.10 168.41 161.93 159.03 158.12 154.94 
  p90/p10 4.97 4.47 4.55 4.54 4.49 4.95 4.36 4.50 4.43 4.11 4.15 4.15 4.18 
  p75/p25 2.16 2.33 2.22 2.26 2.26 2.30 2.32 2.17 2.26 2.28 2.24 2.19 2.05 
 Theil Index Within States(x1000) 25.06 23.59 27.44 31.09 28.01 31.19 27.18 30.64 27.95 29.65 30.26 31.56 32.66 
  Between States(x1000) 150.08 146.17 151.03 142.90 142.89 143.83 143.73 146.46 140.46 132.28 128.77 126.56 122.28 
  Fraction of Between 85.69 86.10 84.62 82.13 83.61 82.18 84.10 82.70 83.40 81.69 80.97 80.04 79.22 
  Mean 0.31 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.52 
  Standard Deviation 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33 
 
 
  
6 
However, there is no big difference between average tuition and the list 
tuition. Subsidy is calculated from the per student appropriation, which is total state 
and local government state appropriation divided by the number of the full-time 
equivalent students. 
We classify two different types of universities: Teaching-Oriented 
Universities, and Research-Oriented Universities. The reason why we need the 
classification is that each state provides a different amount of state appropriation to 
the different types of universities. In terms of Carnegie Foundation Classification 
Codes, Teaching-Oriented Universities include Comprehensive Universities I, II, and 
Liberal Arts College I, II, and Research-Oriented Universities include Doctoral 
Universities I, II, and Research Universities I, II. According to the Carnegie 
classification, Comprehensive Universities proved a full range of bachelor degree 
programs and some graduate programs through the master’s degrees. Comprehensive 
Universities I give at least 40 master’s degrees in more than three majors every year, 
while Comprehensive Universities II offer at least 20 master’s degrees in more than 
one major. Liberal Arts Colleges emphasize undergraduate education to give 
bachelor programs. Liberal Arts College I awards more than 40 percent bachelor 
degrees in liberal arts with more a relatively selective admission standard, while 
Liberal Arts College II provide less than 40 percent bachelor degrees in liberal arts 
with less selective admission policy. Both Doctoral Universities and Research 
Universities provide a full range of bachelor degree programs with graduate 
programs toward the doctor degrees. Research Universities emphasize much more 
research than Doctoral Universities. Depending on the number of doctoral degrees, 
the Carnegie classifies Doctoral Universities I and Doctoral Universities II. Doctoral 
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Universities I provides more than 40 doctoral degrees in more than five majors every 
year, while Doctoral Universities II provide more than 10 doctoral degrees in more 
than three majors, or more than 20 doctoral degrees in more than one major. 
Research Universities award more than 50 doctoral degrees every year. Research 
Universities I receive more than $40 million research funds from the Federal 
Government, while Research Universities II receive more than $15.5 million and less 
than $40 million research funds from the Federal Government.  
In order to characterize how the tuition/subsidy ratio distribution looks, we 
use some inequality measures, such as the Gini index, Theil Index, 75/25 percentile 
ratio, and 90/10 percentile ratio. Referring to Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998), we 
know that the Gini index is the average difference in tuition/subsidy ratio between 
any pair of universities relative to the average tuition/subsidy ratio for all universities 
in the United States. The Gini index is more sensitive to change around the middle of 
distribution than to change from the highest to the lowest distribution of the ratio. 
Since the Gini index cannot be decomposed into between-state and within-state 
differences, we consider the Theil index. Let R  be tuition/subsidy ratio. Rij is the 
tuition/subsidy ratio of j university in state i. The Theil index is calculated by 
48
1 1
1 ln
iN ij ij
i j
R R
T
N R R! !
" #$% $! && % $% $%' (
 (1.1) 
N is the number of total public universities in the U.S. Ni is the number of public 
universities in state i. R  is the average of tuition/subsidy ratio in the United States. 
We do not give any weight to the tuition/subsidy ratio. The advantage of using the 
Theil index is that we can decompose the Theil index into between-state inequality 
and within-state inequality, as follows. 
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48 48
1 1
ln iii ij i i
i i
N R N RRT T
N R R N R! !
" #$% $! ) *%& &$% $%' (
 (1.2) 
where 
48
1 1
1 ln
iN ij ij
i
i j i ii
R R
T
N R R! !
" #$% $! && % $% $%' (
 is the Theil index for state i, and iR  is the average 
tuition/subsidy ratio in state i. The first term of (1.2) is between-state inequality, and 
the second term is within-state inequality, a weighted average of the within-state 
Theil index.  
The 90/10 percentile ratio and 75/25 percentile ratio also measure the 
inequality of tuition/subsidy ratio. These percentile ratios are not sensitive relatively 
to some extreme values of tuition/subsidy ratio unlike the Gini index and the Theil 
index. 
From our data, we observe that between-state differences in tuition/subsidy 
ratio is much larger than the within-state difference in the data. Because the Theil 
index is decomposable, we calculate the ratio of between-state Theil index to within-
state Theil index in Table I. Regardless of classification types of universities, we 
observe that this ratio is much bigger than 50 percent. After classifying the types of 
universities, this ratio is bigger in the research-oriented university than in the 
teaching-oriented university. While within-state differences in tuition/subsidy ratio 
have fluctuated, between-state differences in tuition/subsidy ratio have decreased 
over time. We also observe that the national difference in tuition/subsidy ratio has 
been decreasing by looking at either the Gini index, Theil index, and percentile ratios. 
The between-state differences in tuition/subsidy ratio are larger than the within-state 
differences in tuition/subsidy ratio over this period.  
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Table II. Summary of Tuition over 26 years 
  Year 81 83 85 86 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
 All Types  Gini Index(x100) 24.11 24.68 22.68 20.44 21.92 22.56 22.25 22.50 22.90 21.44 21.02 21.19 21.09 
  Theil Index(x1000) 98.02 100.75 87.73 73.53 84.19 88.87 85.40 86.57 87.75 76.91 74.58 75.45 74.34 
  p90/p10 3.07 3.20 2.87 2.38 2.56 2.63 2.55 2.56 2.64 2.49 2.51 2.47 2.49 
  p75/p25 1.75 1.80 1.63 1.54 1.55 1.64 1.67 1.67 1.75 1.68 1.62 1.63 1.66 
 Theil Index Within States(x1000) 58.75 59.19 52.91 39.98 43.23 49.80 46.60 48.23 49.55 43.32 41.79 41.24 39.56 
  Between 
States(x1000) 59.94 58.75 60.31 54.37 51.35 56.04 54.57 55.71 56.47 56.33 56.03 54.66 53.21 
  Fraction of Between 61.15 58.31 68.75 73.95 60.99 63.05 63.90 64.36 64.35 73.24 75.13 72.44 71.58 
  Mean 941 1196 1445 1573 1780 1918 2077 2254 2574 2914 3126 3288 3518 
  Standard Deviation 435 567 637 649 791 881 937 1019 1163 1226 1299 1370 1451 
 Teaching Univ. Gini Index(x100) 22.64 21.77 19.35 16.98 17.81 18.63 18.07 18.39 19.24 18.07 17.18 17.11 17.50 
  Theil Index(x1000) 83.66 76.06 62.46 48.46 54.33 61.95 54.38 56.26 60.78 52.19 47.41 46.56 48.57 
  p90/p10 2.86 2.90 2.51 2.21 2.16 2.22 2.15 2.25 2.35 2.19 2.12 2.19 2.14 
  p75/p25 1.74 1.66 1.52 1.43 1.43 1.49 1.49 1.50 1.60 1.59 1.51 1.54 1.58 
 Theil Index Within States(x1000) 
16.28 14.02 14.79 13.16 17.58 16.82 14.15 13.51 12.69 12.60 9.79 9.90 10.78 
  Between 
States(x1000) 67.38 62.04 47.67 35.30 36.75 45.13 40.23 42.75 48.09 39.59 37.62 36.66 37.79 
  Fraction of Between 80.54 81.57 76.32 72.84 67.64 72.85 73.98 75.99 79.12 75.86 79.35 78.74 77.81 
  Mean 831 1035 1268 1379 1549 1669 1801 1945 2228 2550 2732 2863 3072 
  Standard Deviation 339 411 449 436 529 632 622 683 817 851 866 895 980 
 Research Univ. Gini Index(x100) 22.02 23.20 22.46 20.04 22.18 22.34 22.29 22.04 21.98 20.93 21.04 21.35 20.58 
  Theil Index(x1000) 82.85 89.47 85.79 70.42 84.22 84.48 84.87 82.03 80.16 72.79 73.22 74.42 70.53 
  p90/p10 2.49 2.66 2.63 2.28 2.42 2.41 2.50 2.57 2.76 2.56 2.63 2.48 2.48 
  p75/p25 1.65 1.73 1.64 1.51 1.69 1.67 1.66 1.66 1.65 1.68 1.73 1.69 1.61 
 Theil Index Within States(x1000) 18.78 19.15 16.05 16.78 20.94 19.65 19.69 17.26 16.03 14.62 14.84 15.66 16.05 
  Between 
States(x1000) 64.07 70.32 69.74 53.64 63.28 64.83 65.18 64.77 64.13 58.17 58.38 58.76 54.48 
  Fraction of Between 77.33 78.60 81.29 76.17 75.14 76.74 76.80 78.96 80.00 79.91 79.73 78.96 77.24 
  Mean 1186 1554 1839 2009 2293 2471 2690 2939 3343 3721 4002 4233 4507 
  Standard Deviation 517 691 799 816 1008 1085 1195 1279 1425 1516 1634 1729 1802 
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Table III. Summary of Subsidy over 26 years 
  Year 81 83 85 86 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
 All Types Gini Index(x100) 22.83 22.85 23.75 23.80 24.67 24.74 23.44 23.77 23.38 22.80 22.52 22.44 21.72 
  Theil Index(x1000) 88.33 88.08 96.76 96.37 100.92 101.83 89.52 92.18 89.01 84.84 83.51 83.65 77.29 
  p90/p10 2.59 2.54 2.68 2.69 2.89 2.87 2.84 2.93 2.83 2.72 2.66 2.62 2.65 
  p75/p25 1.69 1.69 1.76 1.76 1.86 1.83 1.79 1.78 1.76 1.70 1.69 1.69 1.62 
 Theil Index Within States(x1000) 48.94 50.81 55.47 58.18 54.74 55.00 53.16 55.70 54.68 56.04 56.61 56.11 52.68 
  Between States(x1000) 39.39 37.27 41.29 38.19 46.18 46.83 36.36 36.48 34.33 28.80 26.90 27.54 24.61 
  Fraction of Between 44.59 42.31 42.67 39.63 45.76 45.99 40.62 39.57 38.57 33.95 32.21 32.92 31.84 
  Mean 3106 3448 4225 4448 4691 4837 4911 4924 4935 4966 5127 5392 5532 
  Standard Deviation 1409 1545 2026 2123 2267 2355 2199 2242 2197 2152 2212 2340 2286 
 Teaching Univ. Gini Index(x100) 22.64 21.77 19.35 16.98 17.81 18.63 18.07 18.39 19.24 18.07 17.18 17.11 17.50 
  Theil Index(x1000) 83.66 76.06 62.46 48.46 54.33 61.95 54.38 56.26 60.78 52.19 47.41 46.56 48.57 
  p90/p10 2.86 2.90 2.51 2.21 2.16 2.22 2.15 2.25 2.35 2.19 2.12 2.19 2.14 
  p75/p25 1.74 1.66 1.52 1.43 1.43 1.49 1.49 1.50 1.60 1.59 1.51 1.54 1.58 
 Theil Index Within States(x1000) 16.28 14.02 14.79 13.16 17.58 16.82 14.15 13.51 12.69 12.60 9.79 9.90 10.78 
  Between States(x1000) 67.38 62.04 47.67 35.30 36.75 45.13 40.23 42.75 48.09 39.59 37.62 36.66 37.79 
  Fraction of Between 80.54 81.57 76.32 72.84 67.64 72.85 73.98 75.99 79.12 75.86 79.35 78.74 77.81 
  Mean 2731 3023 3701 3851 4067 4179 4203 4172 4200 4215 4373 4622 4755 
  Standard Deviation 994 1112 1535 1470 1648 1660 1500 1484 1476 1408 1459 1530 1509 
 Research  Univ. Gini Index(x100) 23.37 22.69 23.28 23.36 23.58 24.02 22.12 22.31 21.74 21.27 21.40 22.01 20.92 
  Theil Index(x1000) 90.43 84.74 90.64 92.77 92.25 95.67 77.92 78.63 74.79 70.67 72.04 76.81 68.96 
  p90/p10 2.78 2.73 2.91 2.98 2.96 2.99 2.81 3.08 2.91 2.94 2.90 2.86 2.78 
  p75/p25 1.74 1.63 1.66 1.66 1.71 1.87 1.73 1.80 1.73 1.75 1.63 1.69 1.61 
 Theil Index Within States(x1000) 33.50 32.51 36.04 39.01 33.75 35.36 31.03 32.36 29.67 29.53 29.51 30.92 28.25 
  Between States(x1000) 56.93 52.23 54.60 53.76 58.50 60.31 46.89 46.27 45.12 41.14 42.53 45.89 40.71 
  Fraction of Between 62.95 61.64 60.24 57.95 63.41 63.04 60.18 58.85 60.33 58.21 59.04 59.74 59.03 
  Mean 3940 4392 5391 5774 6077 6301 6483 6596 6569 6635 6802 7102 7260 
  Standard Deviation 1791 1915 2460 2685 2788 2948 2651 2699 2622 2551 2646 2870 2733 
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In Table II, we show the pattern of tuition. Like the tuition/subsidy ratio, 
between-state difference in tuition is larger than the within-state difference. Note that  
tuition differences across states are more prominent in those teaching-oriented 
universities than the research-oriented universities. 
In Table III, we show the pattern of state appropriation. Without classifying 
two different types of universities, within-state differences have dominated between- 
state differences in state appropriation. However, when we separate the types of 
universities, we still observe that between-state differences in state appropriation 
have dominated than within-state differences. 
Historically, Goldin and Katz (1998) found that from 1902 to 1940, state and 
local support for public higher education was quite different across states. They 
found that these big differences came from the level and distribution of income in a 
state. We will develop a model to help interpret these sources of differences in 
tuition/subsidy ratio across states.  
 
I.3 Literature Review 
 
If we classify higher education as a private good, we deal with either a 
publicly provided private good or a publicly financed private good. In case of a 
publicly provided private good, there is no user charge but only tax finance. In the 
literature about public provision of private goods, Besley and Coate (1991) found 
that the public provision of private goods can redistribute income from the rich 
households to the poor households, because the rich households will not buy the 
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publicly provided private good, which is of low quality, because quality is assumed 
to be a normal good. Epple and Romano (1996a), and Epple and Romano (1996b) 
studied public provision of private goods when the good is supplemented by a 
privately purchased good, and when a private alternative exists, respectively. Epple 
and Romano (1996a) found that when the good is supplemented in a private market, 
a majority voting equilibrium always exists because of single-peaked preferences 
over public expenditure. Furthermore, they also found that the majority prefers the 
dual-provision regime to both a market-only and government-only regime. Both 
Epple and Romano (1996a), and Epple and Romano (1996b) characterize the voting 
equilibrium in which both the rich households and the poor households oppose the 
middle-income households who favor an increase in public expenditure or public 
alternative. Bös (1980) analyzes the exclusive choice between user charges and taxes 
for publicly provided private goods. In his model, the median voter faces an either/ or 
choice between the two forms of financing the private goods. The trade-off between 
taxes and user charges is essentially a trade-off between efficiency and equity. With 
user charges, the median voter knows that efficiency of the economy is achieved, but 
that equity is not promoted. In the case of exclusive tax financing, a progressive 
income tax will lead to a deviation from allocative efficiency because of the welfare 
cost which arises due to an income tax, but more equity is achieved. Depending on 
the extent of preferences for redistribution, the median voter chooses either one of 
the forms to finance the goods.  
Several papers view higher education as an exclusive public good, because it 
costs almost nothing to exclude some students and in our model. The quality of the 
university is regarded as a congestible public good. In the literature about the 
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exclusive public good, Brito and Oakland (1980) study private provision of exclusive 
public good under the monopoly market, so that there is a user charge, but no tax in 
the model. Burns and Walsh (1981) use the demand distribution to provide different 
pricing strategies than the uniform price. Instead of a profit-maximizing firm, Fraser 
(1996) assumes that the government maximizes utilitarian social welfare by choosing 
the level of user charge. Fraser (1996) compares overall welfare of user charge with 
welfare of tax. The dispersion of income and the degree of inequality aversion 
determine which financing method is better. Swope and Janeba (2001) explain how 
society decides the provision of excludable public goods and financing methods. 
They separate two regimes, in which the median household preference determines 
the level of provision in a tax regime and a household who has higher preference than 
the median household determines the user charge in a user charge regime. Like 
Fraser (1996), they compare the welfare levels of two exclusive financing methods.  
Using club theory, Glazer and Niskanen (1997) examine why the public 
provision of the exclusive public good is of lower quality. Since the rich households 
are more concerned about the quality of good than the poor households, the rich 
households will avoid using that good because of an increase in congestion. 
Therefore, by excluding the rich, the poor households can have benefit due to the 
decrease in congestion. 
Even though both methods of financing higher education are employed 
simultaneously in all states, most research on financing higher education has 
assumed either tax finance or user charge finance, but has not considered the choice 
among mixed financing combinations. In the literature about exclusive tax finance 
analysis for education, most of the models explain why the economy supported 
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higher education through tax. Johnson (1984) justified tax finance for college 
education by production externalities, by which relatively low ability people benefit 
from raising the average human capital of the others. Therefore, there is a possible 
complementarity relationship between the low ability workers and the high skilled 
workers. In his model, the expenditure per capita is fixed, and the government 
decides the subsidy rate. Creedy and Francois (1990) also assumed production 
externalities for the justification of tax finance, in which those who do not enroll 
themselves at the universities benefit from the rate of growth of the economy. Unlike 
Johnson (1984), they assumed that education requires an opportunity cost, forgone 
earnings, and that the household is different in income, not in ability. The 
government decides the subsidy rate to maximize the net lifetime income of the 
median voter in order to obtain majority support. Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) did 
not assume any externality from education, but assumed an imperfect capital market. 
They emphasized the subsidy in the role of redistributing income. Because of credit 
constraints, poor families can be excluded from receiving the education so that they 
efficiently subsidize the education of rich families. The tax rate is determined by 
majority vote. In our model, we have a certain feature as described by the above 
articles. Specifically, holding educational expenditure constant, we assume that the 
state government chooses head tax, and tuition.  
In the literature about exclusive user charge finance analysis, most of the 
models adopt a university decision-making perspective. They do not differentiate 
between the state university and private university. Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984) 
assumed that the university chooses the number of students in different categories 
and financial aid policies to maximize its utility from diversifying the student groups 
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subject to revenue constraint, given that the (marginal) cost of education is fixed. 
Similarly, Danziger (1990) modeled the university as deciding the minimum ability 
of students (admission standard) and tuition to maximize its utility which comes from 
the student’s ability and from tuition level. Rothschild and White (1995) developed a 
model in which the students are treated as both demanders and inputs. In the 
competitive market, tuition internalizes the external effect of students on each other, 
because the higher ability students give an externality to the other students and, 
hence, can receive scholarships. Using the profit-maximization objective function 
like Rothschild and White (1995), Epple and Romano (1998) assumed that the 
students are different in both abilities and income, and that the school quality is 
determined by the peer group effect, as measured by average ability of enrolled 
students. There proposes tuition discrimination across students, because of the 
differentiated contribution of student types to the school quality. Epple, Romano, and 
Sieg (2001) took a different objective function of university, maximization of school 
quality. The quality of school depends on both peer quality (student input) and 
instructional expenditure. The pricing is not different from Epple and Romano (1998). 
Rey (2001) considered the state university competition to explain why we do have so 
many different types of state universities. He assumed that there is no tuition and that 
higher education is solely financed by tax. The funds for universities are supported 
by the government through both a fixed amount and a per student amount. One of the 
main differences in previously described models is that the university does include 
research in the objective function in order to explain the different types of public 
universities.  
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Garratt and Marshall (1994) and De Fraja (1999) are among the few papers 
which allow for both financing methods. Garratt and Marshall (1994) provide a novel 
explanation for the public financing of higher education by introducing a contract 
theory of educational finance. The reason why tax finance has spread across states is 
that every taxpayer agrees to have an implicit lottery over access to higher education. 
The lottery winners obtain a college education by paying a user charge, while both 
winners and losers pay a tax to support the publicly provided higher education 
services. In their model, a lump-sum tax serves as an instrument for common public 
financing from all taxpayers. The rest of the cost of education is financed by the 
college lottery winners who pay tuition. The optimal mix depends on the median 
income level and the cost of education. Though Garratt and Marshall (1994) discuss 
the optimum quality of university, they do not include student input in the quality of 
university.  
De Fraja (1999) explicitly models a state government which maximizes the 
unweighted sum of individual household utilities. Without any intervention of 
government, high-income households are more willing to send their children to 
college than low-income households. Therefore, the market equilibrium is not 
equitable if we define equity as equality of opportunity for higher education 
regardless of income level. The government can pursue two goals of education 
policies; equality of opportunity and efficiency. Since ability of students is assumed 
to be unobservable to the state government, the government can only achieve the 
second best optimal solution by choosing income-based tuition levels, which are set 
by imposing a separate income tax and giving subsidies to low-income households. 
The result is that the government cross-subsidizes college education for high-ability 
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and low-income households with higher tuition collected from relatively low-ability 
and high-income households. While De Fraja (1999) does not consider the quality of 
university and assumes that the educational expenditure is fixed. 
We view the state government as a welfare maximizing government, 
following De Fraja (1999). Unlike De Fraja (1999), we assume a weighted sum of 
social welfare because we view that the state government maximizes political support 
from voters. This is similar to the approach in Peltzman (1971). In this article, 
Peltzman (1971) divides consumers into several groups and allows the manager of a 
public enterprise to charge different prices to different groups.  
 
I.4 Overview 
 
In Chapter II, we start to describe the model and households’ equilibrium. 
Then, we explain how the state government chooses head tax, tuition, and 
expenditure given the marginal household. Since tuition is determined by the state 
budget constraint, the role of head tax resembles Fernandez and Rogerson (1995). 
Neither externality assumption nor credit constraint is assumed in our model, but we 
end up with an exclusive tax finance which is equivalent to the corner solutions. 
State government is assumed to have an authority to impose the head tax across any 
households. However, we have a publicly provided private good, which comes from 
quality of university.  When only the first order condition for head tax is considered, 
the redistribution of income is made between those households who do not enroll 
their children at the university and those households who send their children to the 
university. Among the former group, they do not have any children. Unlike the 
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models in which the supply of education is determined by demand, the number of 
students who are enrolled at the university is determined by both demand and supply 
of public higher education in our models.  
In our model, we include the feature of quality of university which depends 
on both average student ability and educational expenditure as in Epple, Romano, 
and Sieg (2001). We do not allow for price discrimination, i.e. we have uniform 
tuition. We do not consider the objective function of the university, because we are 
dealing with State Regime in which state government decides most of important 
variables. Furthermore, our model does not include research, either from a revenue 
generating or an output dimension. 
 Even though contract theory of finance is a utilitarian model, our model 
assumes a non-symmetric weight among the households. Our model is distinguished 
by the endogenous quality of university, which depends on average student quality 
and per student expenditure.  
 We include how the quality of university is determined and the state 
government chooses the educational expenditure in our model. For simplicity, we 
assume that the households across types are the same in income, and differ in 
whether the households have a child or not, and those types of households who have 
a child are different in the ability of student. 
The household decision with respect to college education is a discrete choice 
problem. The benefit from higher education is, however, assumed to be continuous 
and depends on both ability of student, and quality of university. This educational 
production function is similar to educational attainment which depends on both 
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ability of student and peer group in Epple, and Romano (1998). Our model treats 
quality of university as a publicly provided private good so that those who are 
enrolled at the university share all benefits from the university. Like Epple, Romano, 
and Sieg (2002), quality of university is a function of student input (average student 
quality) and other resources.  
We assume that the government forces the households to pay taxes, but there 
is no rational for this behavior. In general, there are three arguments for the reason 
why the public finances education; positive externalities, better access to distribution, 
and imperfect capital markets. Garratt and Marshall (1994) gave an additional reason 
for public taxation of higher education; gambles and insurance. We view the higher 
education as a publicly financed private good like Garratt and Marshall (1994), but 
following Brueckner and Lee (1989), we will interpret quality of university as a club 
good. Brueckner and Lee (1989) introduced school quality as a club good. In the 
educational production, implicitly, the lower ability type obtains a peer group effect, 
but the higher ability type does not receive any peer group effect. In public higher 
education, a club is a public university and a club developer is state government who 
can determine the fee (user charge), head tax, and the spending on education.  Since 
head tax is not a club fee, but even non-member should pay it, we cannot explain 
why we have head tax in terms of a club good theory. Since a club good is an 
exclusive public good, quality of university is a club good. Only those who enroll 
their children at the university share this quality of university. Depending on what the 
ability of the student is, the benefit from a club good is different, because of the 
educational production function. Because the number of students enrolled is 
negatively related to average student quality, more students bring less benefit to 
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those who stay in the university due to the lower quality of university. This is 
equivalent to the notion of congestion. In case of non-anonymous crowding, the 
crowding cost of each person depends on both the characteristics and number of 
other members in a club. Therefore, we may think that quality of university is 
involved in non-anonymous crowding.5 
The first first-order condition shows how head tax is used as redistributive 
device in the economy. We view the second first-order condition as how the state 
government decides the provision level of public good, which is quality of university. 
The modified Samuelson condition is applied here. Considering both of first-order 
conditions, we prove that there will be an interior solution under the certain 
conditions. Then, we explain shortly what the overall equilibrium is. We provide 
some comparative statics analytically such as the effects of change in income and 
political weight.  
In Chapter III, since we cannot go further to do the comparative statics with 
our analytical approach, we use some specific functions to examine the comparative 
statics and to calibrate some parameters to existing empirical evidence in U.S. public 
universities. Using an additively separable utility function, a Cobb-Douglas return 
function, and a Cobb-Douglas quality production, we solve the first-order conditions 
for the state government. Since it is not possible to find the explicit solution for head 
tax and expenditure, we try to find the expenditure level numerically. Then, 
substituting the expenditure in one of the first-order conditions, we solve for the head 
tax. Since we will have a set of combinations of head tax, tuition, and expenditure 
                                                 
5 Epple and Romano (1998) regard private schools as clubs with “non-anonymous crowding” due to 
the existence of peer group effects. 
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given marginal ability, we find the equilibrium level of marginal ability by checking 
whether the starting marginal ability is equal to the solved marginal ability. Using a 
uniform distribution of students’ abilities, we investigate the effect of change in 
income and change in wage differential between college graduates and high school 
graduates. Change from a uniform distribution to a beta distribution is also added. 
In Chapter IV, we summarize the results, some empirical implications, and 
future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MODEL 
 
II.1 Description of the Model 
 
There are two types of households in the state. N0 number of Type 0 
households have no children and N1 number of Type 1 households have children who 
may or may not attend a university. Each household of Type 1 is assumed to have 
only one child. Let N10 and N11 denote the number of Type 1 households whose 
children do not attend and attend a university, respectively, and let N=N0 +N1 be the 
total number of households. 
All households have a common utility function U(r,x), where x is a 
numeraire composite good and r is the return (human capital) to university education. 
The return to university education is the present value of future wage income after 
college graduation divided by the total number of years. The household with a child 
who has no college education is assumed to have a same annualized income, r0 for 
simplicity. The value of educational return to the households without a university-
attending child is normalized to zero. The utility function is assumed to be a 
differentiable and strictly concave increasing function. The return to education is also 
assumed to be concave in the quality of education (q) and the ability of the student 
(a), 
! ",r r q a#  (2.1) 
which is differentiable everywhere and increasing in both quality of education and 
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the ability of student. The quality of education q depends on average level of enrolled 
students and the per student expenditure (e), 
! ",q q a e#  (2.2) 
which is assumed to be differentiable and strictly increasing in its arguments. 
 Children are assumed to have heterogeneous abilities. The distribution of 
abilities of N1 children is denoted by a distribution function F(a). We assume that 
F(a) is a differentiable continuous distribution function over a normalized unit 
interval [0,1] such that F(0)=0 and F(1)=N1. The derivative of F(a) is denoted by 
f(a) which is nonnegative, f(a)≥0. 
 All households have an identical amount of income y and pay a head tax h. 
When a child of a Type 1 household is enrolled at a university, she has to pay a fixed 
amount of user charge (tuition) which is denoted by t. Type 1 household makes the 
enrollment decision by maximizing its utility. Thus, all Type 1 households choose to 
enroll their child if 
! "! " ! "0, , ,U r q a y h t U r y h$ $ % $  (2.3) 
where the left hand side is the utility when they send their child to university and the 
right hand side the utility when they do not.  
 The household with a child of ability am will be called the marginal 
household. The marginal household is indifferent between university education and 
no education. All Type 1 households with a child of ability higher than am will enroll 
their child at a university. The average ability of students in the quality function, is 
given by 
! "1
11
1
ma
a adF a
N
# &  (2.4) 
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where N11=N1-F(am). N11 is the total number of enrollment. It is easy to see that The 
average ability of students is a monotonically increasing function of am. 
We develop a public choice interest group type model of state government 
decision-making. The state government maximizes the non-symmetric utilitarian 
social welfare function which is defined by the weighted sum of the welfare of all 
households. The aggregate welfare in each group is defined as the sum of individual 
household’s utility in that group. Let AU0, AU10, and AU11, respectively, denote the 
aggregate welfare of Type 0 households, Type 1 households without a university-
attending child, and Type 1 households with a university-attending child. These are 
given by 
! "
0 0
10 0
1
11
(0, )
( ) ( , )
( , ), ( )
m
m
a
AU N U y h
AU F a U r y h
AU U r q a y h t dF a
# ' $
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# $ $&
 (2.5) 
The state government maximizes a weighted sum of the welfare of the households 
with and without college-attending child 
! "0 10 1Max W AU AU w AU# ( ( '  (2.6) 
subject to the state’s balanced budget constraint 
11 11N h N t N e' ( ' # '  (2.7) 
The state government is assumed to choose tuition, head tax, and per student 
expenditure, taking the marginal household as given. The household decides to send 
its child to the university or not, taking the decision variables of the state government 
as given, which is summarized by the following equation: 
! " ! "! "0 , , ,mU r y h U r q a y h t$ # $ $  (2.8) 
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II.2 Household Equilibrium of Education Quality and Marginal Ability 
 
Type 1 households are assumed to be quality takers in their enrollment 
decision. Since both the utility function U and the educational function r are assumed 
to be monotonically increasing, there exists a unique strictly interior minimum 
ability of child, denoted by am, such that 
! "! " ! "0, , ,U r q a y h t U r y h$ $ # $  (2.9) 
if the following conditions are satisfied for a given head tax and tuition 
! "! " ! "
! "! " ! "
0
0
,0 , ,
,1 , ,
U r q y h t U r y h
U r q y h t U r y h
$ $ ) $
$ $ % $
 (2.10) 
The first inequality of (2.10) indicates that the utility of enrolling a child of lowest 
ability is lower than the utility of not enrolling the child. The second inequality of 
(2.10) indicates that the utility of enrolling a child of highest ability is greater than 
the utility of not enrolling the child. If either inequality is not satisfied, a corner 
solution arises; either all Type 1 households enroll their child or none of them enroll 
their child.  
Since Type 1 households are assumed to be quality takers in their enrollment 
decision, equation (2.9) determines the marginal household with ability 
am=am(q;h,t.y) as a function of educational quality given income, head tax, and 
tuition. The marginal ability is a monotonically decreasing function of q. As the 
educational quality increases, more households of lower ability enroll their child, and 
this lowers the marginal ability. This relationship will be called the marginal 
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household response function (MHR) and it is shown as MHR curve in Figure 1. 
Since the educational quality depends on the average ability of enrolled 
students, households’ perceived quality of education may not be the same as the 
quality produced by the quality production function. The quality production function 
is an increasing function of ặ and hence increasing in am, which is shown in as QPF 
curve in Figure 1, where q0=q(0,e) and q1=q(1,e). Given the state government’s 
decision variables h, t, and e, the educational quality is determined endogenously 
where the MHR and QTF curves intersect each other. That is, the equilibrium quality 
is determined where households’ perceived quality turns out to be the realized quality. 
An interior equilibrium of marginal ability and educational quality requires 
inequalities in (2.10) at q=q0 and q=q1, respectively. The households with a child of 
lower ability (a=0) will not enroll their child when the perceived quality of education 
is at the lowest quality level q0. Only households of higher ability child will enroll 
their child, and hence, the marginal ability will be greater than zero, that is, am>0. 
This ensures that point A on the MHR curve will be below the QPF curve. On the 
other hand, the utility of enrolling a child of highest ability is greater than the utility 
of not enrolling the child when the perceived quality of education is at the highest 
level q. Therefore, the households with a child of highest ability (a=1) will enroll 
their child when the perceived quality of education is q1. This implies that the 
marginal household will have a child of ability less than one, and it ensures that point 
B on the MHR curve will be above QPF curve. Define g as the gap between the 
perceived quality and the actual quality. From Figure 1, it is straightforward to know 
that g is a decreasing function of am. Then, the two conditions described above assure 
a unique interior equilibrium by the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. That is, by the 
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Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there is amH such that g(amH)). If either inequality is 
not satisfied, a corner solution arises; either all Type 1 households enroll their child 
when the first condition of (2.10) is not satisfied, or none of them enroll their child 
when the second condition of (2.10) is not satisfied. These results are summarized 
in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Given income and state government’s decision variables (h,t,e), there 
exists a unique interior equilibrium equality of education and marginal ability if and 
only if (2.10) is satisfied. 
 
The interior solution will be denoted by a function of state government’s 
Figure 1. Equilibrium Quality and Marginal Ability 
amH  am 
0 
q 
MHR 
QPF 
qH 
q0 
q1 
A 
 *
A 
 *
A 
B
  
28 
decision variables and income 
! ", , ,Hm ma a h t e y#  (2.11) 
! ", , ,Hq q h t e y#  (2.12) 
The equilibrium marginal ability then determines the equilibrium number of Type 1 
households with a university-attending child 
! " ! "11 1 11 , , ,H HmN N F a N h t e y# $ #  (2.13) 
It is easy to see the effect of the educational expenditure e on the equilibrium. An 
increase in e attracts more students of lower ability, which reduces the average ability 
of the students. The net effect is a decrease in the interior equilibrium marginal  
ability and an increase in the equilibrium quality. Graphically, an increase in e shifts 
the QPF curve upward, resulting in an increase in the equilibrium education quality 
and a decrease in equilibrium marginal ability, i.e., ∂amH/∂e<0 and ∂qH/∂e>0 as seen 
Figure 2.  
A lower tuition also attracts more students of ability lower than the current 
marginal ability and it lowers the educational quality. Hence, the MHR curve shifts to 
the left, resulting in a lower equilibrium values of marginal ability and educational 
equality, ∂amH/∂t>0 and ∂qH/∂t>0 as shown in Figure 3. 
Unlike change in tuition and change in expenditure, a change in head tax or income 
affects all households in the economy. The effect on the household enrollment 
decision depends on the relative magnitude of the marginal utility of the private good 
consumption between the households with and without a college-attending child. 
Consider a case of an additively separable strictly concave utility function. Under 
additively separability, the marginal utility of private consumption does not depend  
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on the educational return. Since a decrease in head tax allows every household to 
have more consumption of private good and marginal utility from an increase in 
private consumption is higher than that of no enrollment option, the marginal 
household becomes infra-marginal household. Student of lower ability becomes the 
marginal ability student. That is, a decrease in head tax decreases the marginal ability 
and educational ability in this case: equality, ∂amH/∂h<0 and ∂qH/∂h>0 which is 
exactly same as in Figure 3. Conversely, a decrease in income raises the marginal 
ability and educational ability in this case: ∂amH/∂y<0 and ∂qH/∂y>0. 
 To show these comparative statics analytically, we substitute the quality 
production function into (2.9) and totally differentiate it. 
Figure 2. An Increase in Educational Expenditure on 
Equilibrium Quality and Marginal Ability 
(amH)1  am 
0 
q 
MHR 
QPF 
(qH)1 
(amH)0 
(qH)0 
  
30 
 
 
 
 
 
! " ! " ! "! "
! "! "
11 11 11
0 0
, , ,
,
mr a m r q e x
x
U r x r da U r x r q de U r x dy dh dt
U r x dy dh
( ( $ $
# $
(2.14) 
where 
11
0
( / ) 0
ma q a m a
x y h t
x y h
r r q da da r
# $ $
# $
# ( +
                      (2.15) 
The last term is the derivative of the educational return with respect to am.  From 
(2.14), we can have 
Figure 3. A Decrease in Tuition on Equilibrium Quality 
 and Marginal Ability 
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The effects of a head tax are in general indeterminate. The numerator of the first term 
in the last expression of (2.18) is positive because of the concavity of the utility 
function, Uxr<0, and the relationship x11<x0 for all t. The second term may take a 
positive or negative value: it takes a positive value if x and r are Edgeworth 
compliments (Uxr>0), it takes a zero value if the utility function is additively 
separable (Uxr=0), and it takes a negative value if x and r are Edgeworth substitutes 
(Uxr<0). Therefore, the effect of a change in head tax on am is positive if Uxr≥ 0, and 
is indeterminate if Uxr<0. It is easy to see that the effect of income is opposite to the 
effect of head tax.. 
 
Proposition 2. Given the condition of (2.10), we have the following comparative 
statics results. 
(a) the equilibrium marginal ability increases and fewer students attend the 
university as the per student educational expenditure falls and tuition rises, 
(b) the equilibrium educational quality increases as the per student educational 
expenditure and tuition rise. 
(c) Both the equilibrium marginal ability and educational quality increase as 
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head tax rises if x and r are Edgeworth complements (Uxr>0) or mild 
substitutes, or if the utility function is additively separable (Uxr=0). If x and r 
are strong Edgeworth substitutes (Uxr<0), the marginal ability and 
educational quality fall as head tax rises, and 
(d) The effects of income on equilibrium are opposite to the effects of head tax. 
 
II.3 State Government’s Problem 
 
Taking the marginal ability am as given, the state government maximizes the 
social welfare function. 
! " ! " ! " ! "10 0 10 0 0 110, , ,maW N U x N U r x w U r x dF a# ( ( & (2.19) 
subject to the state’s budget constraint 
t e h!# $  (2.20) 
The first order conditions (FOC) are 
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The second order conditions are Whh<0, Wee<0 and Whh Wee-Whe2>0, where 
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We know that Whh is negative under the assumption of strictly concave utility. Under 
weak Edgeworth Complementarity, we know that Wee<0.   
In case of an additively separable utility function, we have  
! " ! " ! "1 2,U r x V r V x# (                    (2.31) 
. With this additively separable utility function, we have 
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It is straightforward to show that (2.32) is positive. Therefore, the second order 
condition is satisfied in the case of an additively separable utility function. 
From this additively separable utility function, we can rewrite the first FOC 
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! " ! "2 11 2 0x xwV x V x#  (2.33) 
The left hand side of this equation will be denoted by AMGh and the right hand side 
by AMLh. The second F.O.C (2.22) for the additively separable utility function 
becomes 
! " ! "1 1 11 2 11m e xa V dF a V x#8&  (2.34) 
where V1e=V1rrqqe. The left hand side term represents the aggregate marginal gain 
(AMGe) to the households with university-attending children as the education quality 
rises due to an increase in educational expenditure e. The right hand side term is the 
aggregate marginal loss (AMLe) to the same households as tuition rises with an 
increase in educational expenditure. 
 
II.3.1 Redistributive Device: Head Tax 
Rearranging (2.21), the first FOC, we have 
! " ! " ! " ! " ! "10 0 10 0 0 110, , 1 ,mx x xaN U x N U r x w U r x dF a!( # $ &       (2.35) 
The above equation equates the marginal social welfare of private good among two 
main different groups; those households who do not have any benefit from the 
university and those who enroll their children at the university. Since we assume that 
the state government is am-taker, there is no change in the number of households who 
send their children to the university. Since per student expenditure is fixed, and, 
hence, quality of university is also constant, the role of head tax is the redistribution 
from those who do not send any children to the university to those who enroll their 
children at the university. However, the enrolled households receive an indirect 
income subsidy from the government through tuition. In fact, given the per student 
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expenditure, they will pay less tuition. Those households who do not have benefit 
from college education have the same marginal utility from consumption of private 
goods, while each household among those enrolled households has different marginal 
utility from private goods, because of the different abilities of the students. Now 
suppose that the state government increases the head tax. Each non-enrolled 
household enjoys less utility.  Each enrolled household has a net gain, because this 
household has to pay a head tax, but lower tuition than before. The net gain is 
 ! " 0 10
11 11
1 1 0
N NN
N N
!
9 : (;< ;$ # $ # +< ;< ;<= >
            (2.36) 
Therefore, an increase in head tax redistributes the income from those who do not 
send their children and those who do not have any child to those who enroll their 
children at the university. Equivalently, we can say  
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      (2.37) 
Even though those who do not any benefit from the university have same marginal 
social welfare, those who do send their children cannot have same marginal social 
welfare, because of different ability of student from each enrolled household and the 
restriction to a uniform head tax. Therefore, the state government would like to 
equate average marginal social welfares from two different groups: those who have 
no benefit from the university and those who send their children to the university. 
The left hand side of (2.37) is average marginal social welfare from the former 
group, and the right hand side of (2.37) is that of the latter group. In case of the 
additively separable utility function, in the first FOC, (2.33), it is easy to see that 
x11<x0 for all t=e-θh>0, and x11=x0 for all e=θh. Therefore, by the diminishing 
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marginal utility, we have V2x(x11)>V2x(x0) for all e>θh and V2x(x11)=V2x(x0) for all 
e=θh. These relationships are shown in Figure 4 as a function of h for a given value 
of e. Also shown is AMGh as a function of h for w<1. It is clear that, for a given e, 
the equilibrium for h is a corner solution he=e/θ for all w≥1. 
On the other hand, if w is sufficiently small, the AMGh curve may lie below 
the AMLh curve, and a corner solution of he=0 arises. Specifically, this corner 
solution arises if 
! " ! "2 2 , where /x xw w w V y V y e# $ %     (2.38) 
An interior solution exists under 
1w w& &  (2.39) 
It is easy to see that the interior solution for h is an increasing function of w.  
 Alternatively, for a given weight parameter w, there is a unique level ēh of e 
Figure 4. Solution for Head Tax, Given Expenditure 
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such that a positive interior solution for h exists for e>ēh, a corner solution he=0 for 
e<ēh. This critical value is determined by wV2x(y- ēh)=V2x(y). 
 These results indicate that, if the state government considers the welfare of 
households with university-attending child more or equally important compared to 
the welfare of households without university-attending child, all educational 
expenditure will be financed by the head tax. At the other extreme, educational 
expenditure will be financed by tuition if the welfare of the university-attending 
households sufficiently is less important than the welfare of the households with no 
university-attending child. 
 In order to find the state government’s response function as am increases, the 
AMGh curve shifts downward and the upper bound of h decreases, while the AMLh 
curve does not shift. Therefore, the state government decreases the head tax. Figure 5 
shows that the interior solution for head tax decreases as am increases.  
 
II.3.2 Provision Device: Expenditure 
In order to interpret the second FOC, note that social marginal utility of 
income for those who send their children to the university is 
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The average value of this is 
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From (2.22), we have 
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The left hand side of this equation is a weighted sum of marginal rates of substitution 
(MRS). The weights depend on the political weight, w. This weighted sum of MRS 
comes from the fact that the state government uses a uniform head tax. In case of 
uniform head tax, we cannot apply the usual Samuelson condition, which states that 
the efficient provision of public good occurs when the sum of the marginal rates of 
substitution over all households is equal to the marginal rate of transformation 
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Figure 5. The Effect of an Increase in Marginal Ability (am1< am2) 
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(MRT). According to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), we can modify (2.42) 
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ψq is called “distribution characteristic” of public good, quality of university. This 
depends on the political weight and on the cross partial between private good and 
public good. For instance, in case of Edgeworth Complementarity, as ability of 
student falls, the demand for quality of university decreases. This implies that ψq>0. 
From (2.43), we know that the level of public good will be produced to the point 
where summation of MRS is less than MRT. 
The right hand side is MRT between the public good and the private good. 
Define X as the total expenditure of higher education so that 
11X N e.  (2.44) 
Therefore, the following is true. 
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dq q dq q dq q
. / . 6 .      (2.45) 
This equation shows the MRTqX , which measures how much the private good must 
be given up to produce an additional unit of a public good.  
Under assumption of additively separable utility function, because of u1i=ū1,  
(2.42) becomes 
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q
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The left hand side is summation of MRS between the public good, q and the private 
good for the ith household. Therefore, (2.46) shows that the summation of MRS is 
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equal to the MRT. 
In case of additively separable utility function, from (2.34), it is easy to 
show that the AMGe is a decreasing function of e and AMLe is an increasing function 
of e. 
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A nonnegative tuition t=e-θh>0 imposes a lower bound for e is θh, and nonnegative 
private consumption x11=y+(θ-1)h-e≥0 imposes an upper bound for e, which is y+(θ-
1)h.  
Note that, at the lower bound value of e, educational expenditure is financed 
Figure 6. Solution for Expenditure, Given Head Tax and Given Marginal Ability 
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by head tax only (t=0) and the private consumption is the same for all households 
(x11=x0). Hence, the value of AMLe at the lower bound is equal to N11V2x(x0). At the 
upper bound value of e, tuition is equal to the disposable income and households 
with university-attending child have no private consumption (i.e., x11=0). These 
relationships are illustrated in Figure 6 for the case of interior equilibrium for a given 
h>0. Also shown is the benchmark line N11V2x(x0). An interior solution for e requires  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
11 2 0
11 2 0
e x
e x
AMG e N V x
AMG e N V
>
<
       (2.48). 
The first condition will be satisfied if, at a low level of educational expenditure, its 
marginal production in quality production function is sufficiently high and/or the 
marginal utility of educational attainment is sufficiently high. The second condition 
will be satisfied if the marginal utility of private consumption is sufficiently high at 
x=0. If the first condition is not satisfied, a lower bound corner solution occurs, and 
an upper bound corner solution occurs if the second condition is not satisfied. 
 As am increases, we will study what would happen to the per student 
expenditure. An increase in am, equivalently, a decrease in N11 increases θ, and x11. 
Hence, as am increases, both lower and upper bounds of e increases and the both 
AMLe curve and the benchmark curve shift downward. The effect of an increase in 
am on the AMGe curve can be determined from 
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where V1e(am) is the value of V1e evaluated at a=am, and  
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which is positive as long as f(am)≠0. The effect of am on AMGe is indeterminate in 
general. The first two terms in parenthesis in (2.50) are negative, and the last term 
can be positive or negative, depending on the sign of qea. If qea=0, the derivative in 
(2.50)takes a negative value, and hence the effect of am on the AMGe is negative. In 
this case, the AMGe curve shifts downward as am increases, which is illustrated in 
Figure 7, where AMGe2 and AMLe2 are for a higher value of am, and AMG01 and 
AML01 are values of benchmark line N11V2x(x0) for a lower and higher value of am, 
respectively. Even in this case, the effect of an increase in am on the solution for e is 
a priori indeterminate: it can be positive, negative or zero. On the other hand, if the 
Figure 7. The Effect of an Increase in Marginal Ability on the Solution for Expenditure 
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positive effect of am on qe dominates other negative effects so that the AMGe curve 
shifts upward, then an increase in am increases the solution value for educational 
expenditure. 
 
II.3.3 Optimal Head Tax and Expenditure 
The effect of a decrease in e on the solution for h is illustrated below, where 
an increase in educational expenditure e does not affect the AMLh curve while the 
AMGh curve shifts downward from AMGh(e1) to AMGh(e2). Figure 8 clearly 
indicates that the interior solution for h decreases as e decreases. This result can also 
be shown by taking the total differential of the first order condition (2.33) 
! " ! " ! "2 11 2 01xx xxwV x dh de V x dh!, -' ' $'. /           (2.52) 
which gives 
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The effect of an increase in educational expenditure on tuition is ambiguous in 
general. To show this, we see from t=e-θh that 
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Note that the interior solution for h is less than e/θ, and hence x11<x0 at h=he. When 
the marginal utility is a linear or concave function (i.e. V2xxx≤0), we have 
V2xx(x0)≤V2xx(x11), which implies V2xx(x0)-wV2xx(x11)≤0 for all w<1. In this case, an 
increase in educational expenditure increases both head tax and tuition. When the 
marginal utility is a convex function, we have V2xx(x0)>V2xx(x11). Hence, we have 
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V2xx(x0)-wV2xx(x11)<0 for a sufficiently small w, and V2xx(x0)-wV2xx(x11)>0  for a 
sufficiently large w. When this term is not positive, an increase in educational 
expenditure increases both head tax and tuition. When this term is positive, an 
increase in educational expenditure increases both head tax and tuition if the welfare 
of the university-attending households is sufficiently less important than the welfare 
of the households with no university-attending child. Otherwise, an increase in 
educational expenditure is financed only by an increase in head tax. 
 An increase in head tax h has no effect on the AMGe curve, but it decreases 
the AMLe and increase the benchmark line. As illustrated in Figure 9, an increase in 
h increases the interior equilibrium for e. This positive relationship between h and e  
Figure 8. The Effect of an Increase in Expenditure (e1<e2) 
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can also be verified from the first order condition in (2.34) by taking the total 
differential 
! " ! " ! "1 1 11 2 11 1m ee xxa V dF a N V x dh de!, -$ ' '+ . /         (2.55) 
which leads to 
! " ! "
! " ! "
11 2 11
1
11 2 11 1
1
0
m
xx
xx eea
N V xde
dh N V x V dF a
!'
$ (
%+
             (2.56) 
The effect of an increase in head tax on tuition can be analyzed from t=e-θh so that 
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An increase in head tax thus increases per student expenditure, but the total increase 
Figure 9. The Effect of an Increase in Head Tax on the Solution for Expenditure 
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in tax collection exceeds the total increase in educational expenditure so that tuition 
falls. 
 We showed that there is a positive relation between e and h that satisfies the 
first order condition (2.33) and (2.34). The boundaries within which an interior 
solution can exist for the first order conditions are h≤e/θ for (2.33) and θh≤e≤y+(θ- 
1)h for (2.34). The set of interior solutions of the first order conditions are inside the 
triangle between e=θh and e=y+(θ-1)h. The boundaries and solution lines are shown 
in Figure 10, where ELh and ELe represent the solution locus of the first order 
condition (2.33) and (2.34), respectively. The solution lines are drawn such that the 
ELh line has a steeper slope than the ELe line and the intercept of the ELe line is 
greater than the intercept of the ELh line. The ELh line is drawn to cross the upper 
boundary line, but not the lower boundary line. Conversely, the ELe line crosses the 
lower boundary line, but not the upper boundary line. When these conditions are 
satisfied, there is a unique interior solution of head tax and educational expenditure 
for the state government. 
It is easy to verify from (2.53) and (2.56) that the slope of ELh is greater 
than the slope of ELe, because 
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where the first derivative is the inverse of the ELh line. 
 The intercept term ēh and ēe are the values of educational expenditure that 
satisfy the first F.O.C (2.33) when h=0, i.e. 
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! " ! "11 2e ee xAMG e N V y e$ '  (2.61) 
where AMG(ēe) is the AMGe evaluated at e= ēe. These functions are illustrated as a 
function of educational expenditure in Figure 11. Since the marginal utility of private 
consumption V2x is an increasing function of educational expenditure and the AMGe 
is the decreasing function of e, a sufficient condition for ēe >ēh is either  
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Note that ēe is the optimum tuition when educational expenditure is financed only by  
Figure 10. Determination of Both Head Tax and Expenditure 
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tuition with zero head tax. The condition (2.62) indicates that the marginal gain of 
head tax must exceed its marginal loss at the optimum with zero head tax. 
 
Proposition 3. As long as the condition 0< ēh< ēe<y, there is an interior solution for 
head tax and educational expenditure. 
Proof) Refer to Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. Q.E.D 
In order to prove Proposition 3, we have two Lemmas. 
 
Lemma 3. Given the condition 0<ēh<y, the ELh line cannot cross the lower boundary 
line, but cross the upper boundary line. 
Figure 11. Conditions for Existence of Solution 
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Proof) 
 To show that the ELh line crosses the upper boundary line, note that the 
upper boundary is defined by e=y+(θ-1)h, so that x11=0. Therefore, we need to show 
the existence of h that satisfies the first F.O.C condition, 
! " ! "2 20x xwV V y h$ '  (2.63) 
Since V2x(y-h) is increasing in h, there will be a unique h as long as 
V2x(y)<wV2x(0)<V2x(0). The second inequality is satisfied for all w<1. A sufficient 
condition for the first inequality is 0<ēh<y, which means that the intercept term of 
the ELh line is less than income. This is easy to see from (2.60) that V2x(y)=wV2x(y-
ēh)<wV2x(0), where the last inequality is due to decreasing marginal utility.  
The ELh line cannot cross the lower boundary line e=θh. This can be shown 
by noting that x11=y-h=x0 when e=θh, and hence wV2x(x11)<V2x(x0) for all w<1 and 
the first F.O.C cannot be satisfied. Q.E.D 
 
 Lemma 4. Given the condition 0<ēe<y, the Ehe line cannot cross the upper 
boundary line, but cross the lower boundary line. 
Proof) 
 To show that the ELe curve cannot cross the upper boundary line, note that 
y+(θ-1)h>y> ēe. The fact that AMGee<0 and (2.61) imply  
! "! " ! " ! " ! " ! "11 2 11 21 0e ee e e x xAMG y h AMG y AMG e N V y e N V!% ' & & $ ' &   (2.64) 
The first and the last terms are the AMGe and AMLe at a point on the upper boundary 
point e= y+(θ-1)h. The inequality thus indicates that there is no head tax that satisfies 
AMGe=AMLe.  
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To show that the ELe line will cross the lower boundary line, we need to 
show that there is a head tax level that satisfies the second F.O.C (2.34) at e=θh, 
that is 
! " ! "11 2e xAMG h N V y h! $ '  (2.65) 
Since the AMGe is decreasing in h and the AMLe is increasing in h, there exists a head 
tax h that satisfies this equality if the following inequalities are satisfied; 
! " ! " ! " ! "11 2 11 20  and 0e x e xAMG N V y AMG y N V!( &     (2.66) 
Observing ēe<y<θy and using (2.61), we can write 
! " ! " ! " ! "11 2 11 20  ( $ ' (e ee e x xAMG AMG e N V y e N V y   (2.67) 
! " ! " ! " ! " ! "11 2 11 2 0! 0 & & $ ' &e ee e e x xAMG y AMG y AMG e N V y e N V     (2.68) 
Both (2.67) and (2.68) prove the required inequalities. Q.E.D 
 
 We can do the comparative statics by taking the total differential of the first 
order conditions in both (2.33) and (2.34). 
! " ! " ! "3 4
! "3 4
2 11 2 11
2 0 0
x xx m m
xx
V x dw wV x dy dh de hda
V x dy dh
! !% % ') ' %
' ' $
        (2.69) 
! " ! "3 4
! " ! "3 4
2 11
11 2 11 0
mee ea m x m
xx m m
AMG de AMG f a V x da
N V x dy dh de hda! !
% %
' % ') ' % $
      (2.70) 
Rearranging the terms and using matrix notation, we have 
1 1 111 12
21 22 2 2
m
m
w a m y
a m y
C dw C da C dyA A dh
A A de C da C dy
5 6% %5 65 6 787 78 8 787 7$8 8 77 878 8 777 %8 79 :9 : 9 :
          (2.71) 
where 
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! " ! " ! "
! "
! " ! "
! "
! "
! "
! " ! "
! " ! " ! " ! "
! "
11 2 11 2 0
12 2 11
21 11 2 11
22 11 2 11
1 2 11
1 2 11
1 2 0 2 11
2 2 11 2 11
2 11 2 11
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
m
m m
xx xx
xx
xx
ee xx
w x
a xx m
y xx xx
a ea m x xx m
y xx
A w V x V x
A wV x
A N V x
A AMG N V x
C V x
C wV x h
C V x wV x
C AMG f a V x V x hf a
C N V x
!
!
!
!
$ ') % &
$' (
$' ') (
$ % &
$' &
$' (
$ '
$' ' %
$ &
       (2.72) 
The solution for dh and de are 
! " ! "
! " ! "
22 1 22 1 12 2 22 1 12 2
21 1 11 2 21 1 11 2 21 1
11 22 12 21
1
where, 0
m m
m m
w a a m y y
w a a m y y
A C dw A C A C da A C A C dydh
de D A C dw A C A C da A C A C dy
D A A A A
5 6% ' % ' 75 6 8 77 88 77$ 88 77 88 7 79 : 8 7' % ' % '89 :
$ ' (
    (2.73) 
The effects on tuition are derived from 
! " ! "3 42 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 11 m m
m m
w a a m m y y
dt de dh hda
B C dw B C B C h da B C B C dy
D
! !
!
$ ' '
$ ' % ' ' % '
    (2.74) 
where 
! "
1 11 12 1
2 21 22 11 2 11 0
y
xx ee
B A A C
B A A N V x AMG
!
! !
$ % $
$ % $ % &
     (2.75) 
Therefore, the effects of a change in political weight are 
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22 1
21 1
2 1
0
0
0
w
w
w
A Cdh
dw D
A Cde
dw D
B Cdt
dw D
$ (
'
$ (
'
$ &
 (2.76) 
Graphically, when the political weight increases, the ELh line shifts to right, because 
the state government redistributes the income from those who do not enroll their 
children at the university to those who are enrolling by increasing the head tax. There 
is no shift of the ELe line, because change in the weight parameter does not affect any 
decision about the expenditure directly, because there is no weight parameter in the  
second FOC. The result is shown in Figure 12. 
The effects of a change in income are 
22 1 12 2
11 1 21 2
1 2 2 1
y y
y y
y y
A C A Cdh
dy D
A C A Cde
dy D
B C B Cdt
dy D
'
$
'
$
'
$
    (2.77) 
where 
 
! " ! "
! " ! "
22 1 12 2 1 11 2 0 2 11
11 1 21 2 2 11 2 0
1 2 2 1 1
0
y y ee y xx xx
y y xx xx
y y y ee
A C A C AMG C N V x V x
A C A C NV x V x
B C B C C AMG!
' $ %
' $ (
' $'
   (2.78) 
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An increase in income always increases the educational expenditure. When 
C1y=V2xx(x0)-wV2xx(x11) is not positive, an increased educational expenditure is 
funded by an increase in head tax and reduction in tuition. On the other hand, when  
C1y is positive, tuition rises as income rises, while the head tax may increase or 
decrease depending on the characteristics of the utility functions, return function and 
production function. To have the negative effect of change in income on the head tax, 
the term C1y must be sufficiently large. Graphically, when the term C1y is negative, 
the ELh line shifts to the right. Regardless of sign of the term C1y, an increase in 
income shifts the ELe line shifts upward. As shown in Figure 13, as income rises, 
both head tax and expenditure rise. When the term C1y is zero, there is no shift in the 
Figure 12. The Effect of an Increase in the Political Weight 
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ELh line so that the effect of an increase in income on head tax and educational 
expenditure is positive like the case where the term C1y is positive. When the term 
C1y is positive, an increase in income shifts the ELh line to the left. Since the ELe line 
is flatter than the ELh line, as income rises, the educational expenditure rises in this 
case. Note that the sufficiently larger shift of the ELh may bring less head tax in the 
solution. 
The effect of a change in marginal ability on head tax, expenditure, and 
tuition is indeterminate, in general. Using (2.71), we have 
Figure 13. The Effect of an Increase in Income: 1 0yC &  
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22 1 12 2 11 2 21 1
1 2 2 1
, ,m m m m
m m
a a a a
m m
a a m
m
A C A C A C A Cdh de
da D da D
B C B C hdt
da D
!
' '
$ $
' '
$
      (2.79) 
where 
! " ! " ! "3 4
22 1 12 2
2 11 2 11
m m
m
a a
xx ee m ea m x
A C A C
wV x AMG h AMG f a V x!
'
$' % %
 
! " ! "3 4
! " ! " ! "
11 2 21 1 11 2 11
2 0 2 11
m m ma a ea m x
xx xx m
A C A C A AMG f a V x
V x V x hf a!
' $' %
%
 
! " ! " ! " ! "3 4
! "3 4 ! "3 4
1 2 2 1
1 2 11 2 11
11 2 11 2 11
m m
m
a a m
y ea m x xx m
xx ee xx m m
B C B C h
C AMG f a V x V x hf a
N V x AMG wV x h h
!
!
! ! !
' '
$' % '
% % '
      (2.80) 
An increase in the marginal ability reduces the head tax for a given educational 
expenditure. Therefore, an increase in am shifts the ELh line to the left. On the other 
hand, the effect of an increase in am on the educational expenditure for a given head 
taxis indeterminate, and hence the ELe line may shift up or down as am increases. The 
shift of the ELe line comes from 
! " ! " ! "
! "
0
2 11 11 2 11
11 2 11
mea m x xx m
m ee xxh h
AMG f a V x N V x hde
da AMG N V x
!
$
% '
$'
%
      (2.81) 
The shift of the ELe line depends on the numerator. If the numerator is positive, the 
ELe line shifts upward. In this case, the head tax decreases and the educational 
expenditure may increase or decrease. If the numerator is negative, both head tax and 
educational expenditure will fall as shown in Figure 14. When we assume some 
specific functions in the next Chapter, we derive (2.81) to find that the numerator is  
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positive. This implies that the ELe line will shift upward as am increases. 
 
II.4 Overall Equilibrium 
 
The state government optimization that is described in the first section of this 
Chapter yields 
! "S mh h a$  (2.82) 
! "S me e a$  (2.83) 
Hence, quality production function is 
! " ! "! " ! ",m m mq q a a e a q a$ $  (2.84) 
Figure 14. The Effect of an Increase in Marginal Ability 
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From t=e-θh, we know that 
! "S mt t a$  (2.85) 
The household equilibrium gives  
! ", ,Hm ma a e h t$  (2.86) 
Therefore, the overall equilibrium marginal ability is 
! " ! " ! "! ", ,H S S Sm m m m ma a e a h a t a$  (2.87) 
Define the overall equilibrium value of am as am*. Then, 
! " ! " ! "* * * * * *, ,m m mh h a e e a t t a$ $ $  (2.88) 
In the next Chapter, we use this procedure to find out the overall equilibrium values 
of tax, tuition, and expenditure. 
 
II.5 Comparative Statics 
 
Taking total differential of households’ equilibrium condition , we have  
! " ! "3 4 ! "3 4
1 1 1
2 11 2 0
m mr q a m r q e r a m
x m m x
V r q da V r q de V r da
V x dy dh de hda V x dy dh! !
% %
$' % ') ' % % '
    (2.89) 
Rearranging (2.89), and combining (2.70 ) and (2.71), we have 
11 12 13 1 1
21 22 23 2
31 32 33 3
w y
y
m y
K K K dh L dw L dy
K K K de L dy
K K K da L dy
5 65 65 6 % 787 78 8 77 7 88 8 77 7 88 8 77 7$88 8 77 7 8 78 87 7 8 78 87 7 8 77 78 8 789 :9 : 798 :
     (2.90) 
where 
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! " ! " ! " ! "
! " ! " ! "
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12 12 2 11
13 2 11
21 21 11 2 11
22 22 11 2 11
23 2 11 2 11 2
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0
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0
0
0
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xx xx
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xx m
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ee xx
ea m x xx m a
x x
r q e x
r
K A w V x V x
K A wV x
K wV x h
K A N V x
K A AMG N V x
K AMG f a V x V x hf a C
K V x V x
K V r q V x
K V r
!
!
!
!
!
$ $ ') % &
$ $' (
$ &
$ $' ') (
$ $ % &
$ % ' $'
$ ') % (
$ '
$ ! "
! "
! " ! "
! "
! " ! "! "
1 2 11
1 1 2 11
1 1 2 0 2 11
2 2 11 2 11
3 2 11 2 0
0
0
0
m mq a r a x m
w w x
y y xx xx
y y xx
y x x
q V r V x h
L C V x
L C V x wV x
L C N V x
L V x V x
!% % (
$ $' &
$ $ '
$ $ &
$' '
  
The determinant of the above matrix is 
! ! !
11 12 13
mah eD K K K
%' '
$ ; ' ; % ;  (2.91) 
where, 
!! !!
!! !!
!! !!
22 33 23 32
21 33 23 31
21 32 22 31
h
e
a
K K K K
K K K K
K K K K
( (
& &
(
&
(
&
%'
% % %
% %'
; $ '
; $ '
; $ '
 (2.92) 
Since K23 and K32 are ambiguous, we can have four possible cases. We will consider 
only one case in which K23<0, and K32>0, because we have more sufficient condition 
to have negative determinant than the other cases. In this case, we have definite signs 
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for Ωe>0, and Ωa>0, but still ambiguous sign for Ωh. The sufficient condition for the 
negative determinant is Ωh>0. That is, K22/K23< K32/K33.   
The effects of change in weight parameter are 
1
h
wLdh
dw D
;$                        (2.93) 
1
e
wLde
dw D
' ;$  (2.94) 
1
ma
m wda L
dw D
;$  (2.95) 
! "3 41 mae hw mm
m
L hdadt de dhh
dw dw dw dw D
! !
! !
' ; %; % ;
$ ' ' $     (2.96) 
If K23<0 K22/K23< K32/K33, and K32>0, then dh/dw>0, de/dw<0, dam/dw>0, and 
dt/dw<0. 
The effects of change in income are 
3 4 3 41 2 12 33 13 32 3 12 23 13 22
1 h
y y y
dh L L K K K K L K K K K
dy D
, -$ ; ' ' % '< =. /     (2.97) 
3 4 3 41 2 11 33 13 31 3 11 23 13 21
1 e
y y y
de L L K K K K L K K K K
dy D
, -$ ' ; % ' ' '< =. /     (2.98) 
3 4 3 41 2 11 32 12 31 3 11 22 12 21
1
mam
y y y
da L L K K K K K K K K K
dy D
, -$ ; ' ' % '< =. /    (2.99) 
We cannot go further how to sign the above results so that we use simulation to 
explain the comparative statics in the model. 
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CHAPTER III 
SIMULATION 
 
In this Chapter, we will use some specific functions in order to examine 
marginal ability, tuition, head tax, tuition/subsidy ratio, expenditure and quality, and 
do the comparative statics. 
 
III.1 Specification 
 
We will analyze the equilibrium for the following specific functions. 
! ", , 0U r x r x! " !#$ % & &'( )& &'  (3.1) 
,r q a# $% # $$ )& &'( )& &' (3.2) 
! " ! "q a e& ' & '$ )& &'( )& &'  (3.3) 
We will consider cases where the student ability takes either uniform distribution or 
beta distribution.  
 
III.1.1 Uniform Distribution of Student Ability 
Assume that the student ability distribution is uniform. Therefore, we have 
! " 1f a N$  (3.4) 
These functions give 
! " ! " ! "2 2
1 1
,x xx
e r q e
V x x V x x
V V r q a e a
! !
(" ) "$
! ! !
)%
*' *+
*'
$ $ *'
$ $
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1
where 
2
maa) "'# ( "&# %$ ( $ ( $                    (3.5) 
! "
! "
! "
11 1
1
2
1
1
1
1
m
m
m
m m
N N a
N
N a
N
a N a
*
**
$ *
$
*
,$ $
, *
 (3.6) 
The first FOC from state government’s optimization gives 
! "! " ! "w y h e y h! !* *' *'% *' * $ *  (3.7) 
From (3.7), we can derive 
! " ! "! "
! " ! "
! "
! "
1/ 1 1/ 1
1/ 1
1/ 1
1 1
1
where 
w e w y e y
h
w
w
! !
!
!
+
+ **
+
* * * *
* *
*
% * * *
$ -
% *'% *'
$
  (3.8) 
The second FOC from state government’s optimization AMGe=AMLe.  
! "1 11 1
1
1
1 1
2 1
m me ea a
m m
AMG V dF a N a e a da
a a
N e
(" ) "$
( "$
" )
% )
% )
"$
*'
%
*'
$ $. .
/ 0% *12$ 12 123 4 %
               (3.9) 
! " ! "5 61 1e mAML N a y h e
!! * *'$ * % *' *                 (3.10) 
We can solve for the inverse optimal function which determines the ELe line. 
! "! "! "1 uniformh e e y) !,*
*' *'$ % *
*'
        (3.11) 
! " ! "
! "! "
! "1/11
where 
2 1 1
mm
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m
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a
!( "$
", % )
! "$
*'
%/ 0/ 0 *'% 12 12 12 1 1$ 22 1 122 12 1% *3 4 123 4
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III.1.2 Beta Distribution of Student Ability 
The beta distribution of student ability is defined by 
! " ! "! " ! "
7 8
1 11 1
,
where 0,1 , , 0
p qNf a a a
B p q
a p q
* *$ *
9 :
 (3.12) 
Note that p, and q are the shape parameters. B(p,q) is the beta function, which is 
defined by 
! " ! " 11 10, 1
qpB p q a a da**$ *.  (3.13) 
The method of moments gives the values of p, and q from the following equations. 
! "
2
2
(1 ) 1
(1 )1 1
a ap a
s
a aq a
s
/ 0* 12$ * 12 123 4
/ 0* 12$ * * 12 123 4
! !!
! !!
 (3.14) 
where ǎ is the sample mean, and s is the sample standard deviation.  The beta 
distribution function becomes uniform when p=q=1. The formula for the cumulative 
distribution function of the beta distribution is 
! " ! " ! "
111
0 1,
m qa p
m
NF a a a da
B p q
**$ *.  (3.15) 
 The average student quality is 
! " ! "
1
1
1
ma
m
a af a da
N F a
$ .*
 (3.16) 
For the state government optimization, there is no change in the first FOC from this 
quadratic distribution, but there is a change in the second FOC 
! " ! "1 11 1m me ea aAMG V dF a N a e a f a da
( ) "$) *'$ $. .    (3.17) 
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Again, there is no change in AMLe. Therefore, we will have the following inverse 
optimal solution for expenditure, which determines the ELe line. 
! "! "! "1 betah e e y) !,*
*' *'$ % *
*'
 (3.18) 
where 
! " ! "
! "1/1
11
ma
beta
a f a da
a
N
!"$
(", % )
!
*'/ 01.2 12 1$2 12 1123 4
 
. 
III.2 Simulation 
 
III.2.1 Procedure 
We will explain how we obtain our simulation result. Firstly, consider the 
state government’s optimization problem. Given am, the solution for the state 
government should satisfy two first-order conditions.  Regardless of student ability 
distribution, from the first FOC, we have  
! "1e y
h
+
+ *
* *
$
% *'
 (3.19) 
This will give the ELh curve for the state government. From the second FOC, we 
have  
! "! "! "1h e e y) !,*
*' *'$ % *
*'
 (3.20) 
where  
 
! "
! "
  if  is uniform distribution
  if  is beta distribution
uniform
beta
f a
f a
,
,
,
; <= == == =$ > ?= == == =@ A
   (3.21) 
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As mentioned in the previous section, (3.20) is the inverse equation of the solution 
value for educational expenditure ELe for a given head tax.  
Eliminating head tax from these equations, we can derive 
! " ! "! " 0e e y! "# $ % # #$#$ #$% #$ % # &  (3.22) 
which can be solved for the solution value of educational expenditure. Then the 
solution value for head tax can be computed from the equation of ELh (3.19).  
 The household equilibrium is determined by  
! " ! "! " ! " ! "01mq a y h e r y h
& " & "' () $% % # # & % #     (3.23) 
This can be expressed by 
! "
! " ! "' ( ! "! "0 1
m
r y h y h e
a a
e
"& "
* &(
& !
$
)
% # # % # #
&     (3.24) 
where the average student ability is defined by (3.5) for the uniform distribution and 
(3.16) for the beta distribution. 
The overall equilibrium will include the household’s equilibrium so that we 
put the optimized values of head tax, tuition, and expenditure into the household’s 
equilibrium equation. When the given marginal ability for the government is same as 
the marginal ability that is obtained from the household equilibrium, we will have the 
equilibrium marginal ability, which, in turn, gives the equilibrium value of tuition, 
head tax, and educational expenditure.  
 
III.2.2 Simulation 
In order to find out what some of the endogenous variables are, such as 
educational expenditure per student, tuition, and tuition/subsidy ratio, we consider 
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data set, especially, in year 1996. As mentioned in Chapter I, the reported tuition is 
sticker resident tuition. Subsidy is the reported state appropriation divided by the 
number of the full-time equivalent students. In the model, expenditure per student is 
summed by both tuition and subsidy, but from the real data, since we have the other 
expenses such as expenditure used for research, and public service. Therefore, we 
calculate the expenditure per student by summing tuition and subsidy. We report 
these in Table IV, where we consider only 10 states, which belong to the State 
Regime. 
For the 422 public universities in the U.S., we have $8378 for the 
(calculated) expenditure per full-time equivalent student, $2845 for tuition, and 0.6 
for tuition/subsidy ratio. For instance, in Texas, we have $7358 for the (calculated) 
expenditure per full-time equivalent student, $1931 for tuition, and 0.38 for 
tuition/subsidy ratio.  
One possible candidate for y is median household income. Referring to Table 
V, for the baseline model, we will use the U.S. median income so that y=5.152, 
measured by $10,000. The number of total households, and the number of Type 1 
households who have children are reported in Table V.6 The ratio of total number to 
the number of Type 1 households varies from 2.44 to 3.19. In the U.S., the number of 
total households is 105,480,101, the number of Type 1 households is 38,022,115, and 
the ratio between these two numbers is 2.77. For simplicity, those children who are 
not enrolled at the university, regardless of abilities, we assume that the return of 
high school graduate is r0, which is the annualized income for high school graduate. 
Levy and Murnane (1992) provide annual wage profile among different age groups  
                                                 
6 We do not think this family ratio changes much so that we use the ratio of the year 2000 instead of 
year 1996. This is from the CPS 2000. 
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for different years in U.S. Averaging the wages of three different age groups among 
high school graduates for the year 1987, we have $34,260 for the mean wage of high 
school graduates in 1996 dollars. Therefore, we set the annualized wage income for 
those who do not send their children to the university at r0=3.43. In order to calibrate 
μ, we consider the average wage of college graduates. From Levy and Murnane 
(1992), we have $48,877 for the mean wage of college graduates. From our 
Table IV. Expenditure, Tuition, Subsidy, and Tuition/Subsidy 
 
States 
# of 
Universities 
Reported 
Expenditure Tuition Subsidy 
Calculated 
Expenditure 
Tuition/ 
subsidy 
California 25 18845.12 2583.80 6905.56 9489.36 0.37 
  (16163.04) (1071.05) (2140.70) (3083.96) (0.08) 
Colorado 12 12233.57 2487.67 3237.25 5724.91 0.77 
  (5523.37) (839.96) (805.66) (1543.87) (0.14) 
Florida 8 16095.99 1779.50 7411.79 9191.29 0.26 
  (4769.66) (153.77) (2014.17) (1966.69) (0.07) 
Indiana 14 13548.69 2952.43 5281.79 8234.22 0.59 
  (6718.52) (338.87) (1563.50) (1794.16) (0.13) 
New York 26 16506.96 3713.81 6364.00 10077.80 0.68 
  (8751.16) (291.15) (3263.67) (3365.93) (0.20) 
North Carolina 15 17647.46 1693.73 7857.08 9550.82 0.23 
  (8947.58) (238.45) (2648.60) (2772.37) (0.07) 
Oklahoma 11 10238.05 1801.36 4108.21 5909.57 0.47 
  (3954.84) (217.82) (1537.85) (1705.47) (0.10) 
South Dakota 3 9671.58 2604.00 3609.24 6213.24 0.81 
  (3111.36) (156.35) (1582.13) (1733.51) (0.30) 
Texas 25 12688.36 1931.24 5426.72 7357.96 0.38 
  (3701.44) (293.98) (1375.63) (1408.29) (0.10) 
Washington 6 20396.00 2749.83 6094.49 8844.33 0.48 
  (14121.71) (351.54) (1899.29) (2223.74) (0.10) 
U.S. 422 15311.56 2845.36 5532.48 8377.84 0.60 
  (9528.24) (1010.25) (2285.56) (2596.74) (0.35) 
Notes:  Reported expenditure is total current fund expenditure divided by the number of 
full-time equivalent students. Calculated expenditure is summed by both tuition and 
subsidy. 
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simulation result, we find that μ=5.7 yields the approximate value of the average 
annualized income, which is $49,252. Given quality of university, and using 
equilibrium marginal ability, we calculate the average annualized income. That is,  
! " ! "
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! "
! "! " ! "! "
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. .
      (3.25) 
When we have aw=49,252, am=0.598, q=0.964,B=0.4, and C=0.6, we will have 
μ=5.7. In our baseline model, we use a uniform distribution of students’ abilities. In 
our alternative distribution, we use a beta distribution for the students’ abilities. Since 
it is impossible to find out the student ability distribution by states, we use the 
preliminary SAT/National Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test (PSAT/BMSQT) as a  
Table V. Simulation for Income and Population 
States Median Income 
Total 
Households Type 1 Households N/N1 
California 53,807 11,502,870 4,569,910 2.52 
Colorado 53,632 1,658,238 585,387 2.83 
Florida 44,829 6,337,929 1,986,554 3.19 
Indiana 52,962 2,336,306 834,826 2.80 
New York 52,799 7,056,860 2,466,483 2.86 
North Carolina 46,973 3,132,013 1,104,659 2.84 
Oklahoma 43,138 1,342,293 479,275 2.80 
South Dakota 45,043 290,245 100,977 2.87 
Texas 46,757 7,393,354 3,027,570 2.44 
Washington 53,153 2,271,398 799,102 2.84 
U.S. 51,518 105,480,101 38,022,115 2.77 
 
Notes: Median household is from http://www.bls.census.gov, households information  
comes from http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/BasicFactsServlet. 
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proxy for the student ability distribution. PSAT/BMSQT is a standardized test, which 
gives the practice for SAT, but can be qualified for National Merit Scholarship 
programs.7 Table VI shows the verbal scores of PSAT/BMSQT for those seniors in 
high schools who took this test. We concentrate on four states, because it is enough 
to show how student ability distribution is different by states in terms of mean and 
standard deviation. Compared between Texas and the other three states, the means 
are statistically different as we easily calculate t value for differences in mean 
between two states from Table VI. Using Table VI, we draw distributions of student 
scores by four states in Figure 15.  The distribution of PSAT score looks like 
                                                 
7 Refer to http://www.collgeboard.com.  
Table VI. Student Ability Distribution by States: Verbal Score in PSAT 
 
  US California Texas Florida Colorado 
Score  Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
75-80   10,646 0.8 1,408 1.03 829 0.69 316 0.63 158 0.80 
70-74  23,956 1.8 2,363 1.72 1,902 1.59 1,037 2.05 326 1.65 
65-69  54,550 4.1 5,482 4.00 3,959 3.30 2,373 4.69 858 4.35 
60-64   106,518 8.0 10,206 7.45 7,567 6.31 4,435 8.77 1,707 8.65 
55-59   168,634 12.6 16,179 11.81 12,334 10.28 6,664 13.18 2,736 13.87 
50-54   226,913 17.0 20,959 15.30 17,766 14.81 8,829 17.47 3,589 18.19 
45-49   271,297 20.3 26,925 19.65 22,965 19.15 9,972 19.73 4,222 21.40 
40-44   225,410 16.8 23,218 16.95 22,293 18.59 7,985 15.80 3,214 16.29 
35-39   117,362 8.8 13,477 9.84 13,295 11.08 3,991 7.89 1,454 7.37 
30-34   80,638 6.0 10,101 7.37 10,146 8.46 2,857 5.65 915 4.64 
25-29   32,396 2.4 3,817 2.79 4,539 3.78 1,330 2.63 365 1.85 
20-24   19,450 1.5 2,868 2.09 2,356 1.96 762 1.51 188 0.95 
TOTAL 1,337,770 137,003 119951 50551 19732 
MEAN  48.3 47.6 46.4 48.8 49.3 
STD. 
EV.  10.5  11  10.9  10.7  10  
Notes: The source is from http://www.collegeboard.com/research/html/2001_psat_pdf_jr.html. 
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normal distribution, but in our model, the ability is ranged from zero to one. In the 
United States, the sample mean, and the sample standard distribution gives the 
possible range of ability from zero to one, we use the beat distribution as an 
alternative distribution to the deviation are 48.3 and 10.5, respectively. We change 
the scale into 0.483 and 0.105, and hence, we calculate p, and q from (3.14) so that 
p=10.46, and q=11.19. Note that different combinations of these two shape 
parameters give a variety of different distribution of students’ abilities. Using the U.S. 
example, we show our alternative distribution, beta distribution in Figure 16. As 
shown in Figure 16, the beta distribution replicates the U.S. distribution of PSAT 
scores closely. We check the possible value for political weight to have meaningful 
equilibrium values, which mean that we have some interior solutions for the state 
government. No corner solution exists when w≥0.9. We set w=0.95 in our baseline 
model, which implies that the state government equally views among those who have 
no direct benefit from university education and those who send their children to the 
university. The households have same degree of satisfaction from consuming private 
good or from consuming education good, because the return from education is an 
annualized future income. Therefore, we set #=D=0.5. We assume more relative 
importance of student’s own ability than the quality of university, so that B=0.4, and 
C=0.6. In the same way, in the quality production function, we assume more relative 
importance of educational expenditure than the average student ability, so that E=0.4, 
and F=0.6. 
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Figure 15. Student Ability Distribution in U.S.: Verbal Score in PSAT 
Figure 16. The Beta Distribution, where p=10.46, q=11.19, N1=38,022,115 
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III.2.3 Comparative Statics in State Government’s Optimization 
In order to have more intuition for overall equilibrium, we will take a deeper 
look at the state government’s optimization in the case of a uniform distribution. In 
order to check the effect of change in marginal ability on the optimal solutions of the 
state government, consider the following comparative statics as derived from Chapter 
II. 
! " ! "5 6 ! " ! " ! "11 2 11 2 0 2 11mea m x xx xx m
m
A AMG f a V x V x V x hf ade
da D
** % %
$    (3.26) 
Since the second term of the numerator in (3.26) is positive, the effect of an increase 
in am on the educational expenditure depends on the first term of the numerator. We 
know that 
! " ! " ! "! "5 6
! "! " ! " ! "! "5 6
11
1
1
1 1 1
2
1 1 1
mea m m m m
e m m m
m m
N eAMG a a a a
AMG a a a
a a
)
( "$ "$
(
"$ "$
"$
) ( "$
( "$
*'
*' %
%
%
$ % '* * % %
$ '* * % %
'* '*
    (3.27) 
The terms in the brace are illustrated in Figure 17, where the first term is downward 
sloping and the second term is upward sloping. Since υ<1<2(1+αδ), there is a unique 
value am* such that 
*0 if 
mea m m
AMG a a: &  (3.28) 
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and vice versa. Now, we will check the sign of the following term 
 ! " ! "2 11mea m xAMG f a V x%  (3.29) 
Substituting first-order condition AMGe=N1(1-am)V2x(x11), we have 
! " ! "
! " ! "
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1 2 11 1
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1
1 1
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   (3.30) 
where 
! " ! "! "1= 1 1 0m m ma a a"$ "$"$%G '* * % * :  
To show Ψ>0, we use the fact that Ψ=1 for am=0 and Ψ=0 for am=1, and Ψ is a 
monotonically decreasing in am. The last fact is from 
! " ! " ! "5 6
! " ! "
1
1
1 1
1 1 0
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a a a a
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  (3.31) 
Figure 17. 
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73 
Therefore, it is true that  
! " ! "2 11 0mea m xAMG f a V x% :  (3.32) 
Therefore, from (3.26), the effect of an increase in am on educational expenditure is 
always positive. Graphically, as marginal ability increases, the ELe line shifts upward.  
On the other hand, since this specific function belongs to the additively separable 
utility function, as marginal ability increases, the ELh line shifts to the left. As 
marginal ability increases, the educational expenditure will always increase, but the 
head tax may increase or decrease. Using uniform distribution function, we confirm 
this analysis about the effect of change in marginal ability on the educational 
expenditure in Figure 18.  
 In order to know more about the effect of change in marginal ability on 
the head tax, consider the following comparative statics as derived in Chapter II 
! " ! " ! "5 62 11 2 11mxx ee m ea m x
m
wV x AMG h AMG f a V xdh
da D
** % %
$   (3.33) 
Again, the effect of change in am on head tax depends on the numerator. We know 
! "
! " ! "
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! " ! "! " ! "! "
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where we used second FOC. Therefore, we can write  
! " ! " ! " ! "5 62 11 1 2 11 1 11mea m x ee m xAMG f a V x AMG h N V x* ) )% % $ * H %H *   (3.35) 
where 
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    (3.36) 
Note that the ELe line indicates that 0≤σ≤1 at any solution. Therefore, a sufficient 
condition for (3.35) to take a positive value is either Ф1≥1 or Ф2≥1 or Ф= Ф1+Ф2>1. 
Since the numerator of Ф1 is a decreasing function of am and its denominator is 
increasing in am, there is a unique value of am such that 
1 1 as 1m
a ( )
( )
: & % *'H
& : % *
 (3.37) 
If υ+σ<1, then Ф1 takes a value less than one for all positive am. However, if there is 
Figure 18. The Effect of an Increase in am on Expenditure 
: Uniform Distribution of Student Ability 
 
  
75 
a sufficiently strong increasing returns to scale (λ+κ>1) in the quality production 
function and the marginal utility of education quality is high, (i.e., αγ is large), then 
Ф1 will take a value greater than one for a low marginal ability.  
A similar analysis shows  
! "! " ! "2 1  as  1 1 m m ma a a"$ "$"$ ) '%: &H % * '*& :    (3.38) 
Define the left hand side function in (3.38) as LHS1 and the right hand side function 
as RHS1. Since LHS1 is zero when am is zero or one, and LHS1 is maximum value 
when am=αδ/(1+ αδ). RHS1 is a decreasing function of am. Note that the RHS1curve 
is flatter than the LHS1 curve at am=1, because 
! " ! "
1 1
1 1
1 1
m m
m ma a
HS LHSabs abs
a a
"$ ) "$
$ $
/ 0 / 01 1,I ,2 21 12 2$ % : $ %1 12 21 12 21 1, ,1 12 23 4 3 4
   (3.39) 
Therefore, there is a unique value of marginal ability below which Ф2 takes a value 
greater than one as shown in Figure 19. 
 Now, consider both Ф1 and Ф2 terms. 
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   (3.40) 
The sufficient condition for Ф>1 is 
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   (3.41) 
Note that LHS2 is a monotonically decreasing function of am with a value υ+σ at 
am=0 and σ at am=1. RHS2 is monotonically increasing in am with a zero value at  
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am=0 and one at am=1. Figure 20 illustrates that there is a unique am below which 
Ф>1. Therefore, when the marginal ability is low, the equation (3.35) will take a 
positive value. If am is high and the solved head tax is high, the equation (3.35) can 
take a negative value. If there is a sufficiently large increasing returns to scale in the 
quality production function and the marginal utility of educational quality is high, 
when am is low, as the marginal ability increases, the head tax will increase from 
(3.33). That is, the numerator of dh/dam is positive so that the solution value of head 
tax will increase as marginal ability increases. Otherwise, we have a negative effect 
of change in marginal ability on the head tax. We confirm this analysis using 
simulation as shown in Figure 21. As am rises, head tax increases before am=0.14, 
and decreases beyond am=0.14. 
 The effect of change in am on tuition, which is derived in Chapter II is 
! " ! " ! " ! "# $
! "! " ! "! "# $
1 2 11 2 11
11 2 11 2 11
my ea m x xx m
xx ee xx m m
m
C AMG f a V x V x hf a
N V x AMG wV x h hdt
da D
!
! ! !
% &' ( ') *
) *
) *
( ( ') *+ ,-    (3.42) 
The effect of an increase in am on tuition is indeterminate, in general. Our simulation 
result for the relationship between tuition and marginal ability is shown in Figure 22. 
To the opposite of the effect on the head tax, as am rises, tuition decreases before 
am=0.14, and increases after am=0.14. The reason why the graph is sloped upward 
beyond am=0.14 is that the second term of the numerator dominates the summation  
of the first term and the third term.8 
 The effect of change in am on subsidy is 
 
                                                 
8 In general, C1y is indeterminate, but positive in our Simulation.  
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m
m m
ds dhh
da da
! !- (  (3.43) 
where θm= θh/(1-am). Since the first term in (3.43) is positive, and the second term 
is positive at a certain value of am, we expect that the effect of an increase in am is 
positive before that certain value of am. Beyond this value of am, it depends on which  
term of (3.43) is bigger. From our simulation, the effect of an increase in am on  
 
Figure 21. The Effect of an Increase in Marginal Ability on Head Tax:  
Uniform Distribution of Student Ability 
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Figure 22. The Effect of an Increase in am on Tuition, Subsidy, Tuition /Subsidy Ratio, and  
Quality of University: Uniform Distribution of Student Ability 
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subsidy is always positive as shown in Figure 22. 
 The effect of an increase in am on tuition/subsidy ratio depends on how fast 
tuition or subsidy rises as marginal ability rises. In Figure 22, we draw the graph for 
tuition/subsidy ratio. The effect of an increase in am on tuition/subsidy ratio is 
negative, because the level of tuition does not increase much, but the subsidy rises 
much more quickly as am rises. 
The effect of an increase in income on the educational expenditure is 
! " ! "2 11 2 0 0xx xxNV x V xde
dy D
$ :  (3.44) 
Therefore, regardless of what kind of ability distribution is, with our specific form of 
additively separable functions, as income rises, the educational expenditure will 
always rise. We confirm this by considering different income levels. The effect of an 
increase in income on head tax is 
! " ! "1 11 2 0 2 11ee y xx xxAMG C N V x V xdh
dy D
%
$    (3.45) 
From our simulation, we observe that there is almost no effect of an increase in 
income on head tax. This implies that C1y is positive. The effect of an increase in 
income on tuition is positive, because 
1y eeC AMGdt
dy D
**
$  (3.46) 
which also implies that C1y is positive.  
Instead of using uniform distribution of students’ ability, we use the beta 
distribution to check what the effect of an increase in am on expenditure, head tax, 
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tuition, and tuition/subsidy ratio is. This is shown in Figure 23. We can say that the 
effect of an increase in am is not much different from the case of a uniform 
Figure 23. The Effect of an Increase in am on Expenditure, Head Tax, Tuition, and Tuition /Subsidy 
Ratio: Beta Distribution of Student Ability 
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distribution. We observe that as am rises, the educational expenditure also increases, 
except some ranges between am=0.95 and am=1. The reason why expenditure 
decreases as am rises is that change in aggregate marginal gain from an increase in 
expenditure becomes negative, and that the distribution values in the ranges between 
am=0.95 and am=1 are almost zeros. The rate of rise of expenditure in the case of beta 
distribution is lower than that of uniform distribution. The same pattern is observed 
for tuition, subsidy, and quality of university. Regarding the effect of an increase in 
am on head tax, we do not observe an increase in head tax up unlike the case of 
uniform distribution. Tuition/subsidy ratio decreases much more slowly than the 
uniform distribution case.  
 
III.3 Simulation Result: Overall Equilibrium 
 
Given a uniform distribution of student ability, we investigate the effect of 
change in income on marginal ability, expenditure, tuition, tuition/subsidy ratio, and 
quality of university. For ten different state median incomes, we show the simulation 
results in Table VII. From our baseline model, in U.S. expenditure, tuition, and 
tuition/subsidy ration, respectively, are $11,209, $4,934, and 0.79 from our 
simulation, which are higher than the real data for Texas from Table IV. In overall 
equilibrium, as income rises, more students will attend the university, as shown that 
there is a decrease in the marginal ability from Table VII. The effect of an increase in 
income on the educational expenditure is positive as derived in (3.44). We can 
confirm that as income increases, the expenditure rises in Table VII. The effect of an 
increase in income on the head tax is ambiguous as shown in (3.45). Note that in our  
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simulation, C1y>0. Therefore, as income increases, the dominance of the second term 
of (3.45) over the first term becomes no longer true, so that the effect of an increase 
in income on the head tax may be negative as shown in Table VII. The effect of an 
increase in income on tuition is positive if C1y>0, which is true in our simulation, as 
shown in (3.46). It is straightforward to know that the quality of university will 
increase as income rises, because there is no change in student input, but an increase 
in educational expenditure. Tuition/subsidy ratio rises as income increases, because 
tuition rises faster than subsidy. The annualized income of the marginal ability 
student rises as income increases, because quality of university increases with no 
change in the marginal ability. 
Since each state differs widely in location, industry, and resource, the degree 
of attraction to college education will be different. According to Goldin and Katz 
(1998), the state government regards the public universities as the main organizations  
Table VII. Change in Income : Uniform Distribution 
States Income Level am h e t t/s q r 
Oklahoma  43,138 0.61 840 10,138 4,124 0.69 0.93 41,177 
Florida  44,829 0.61 855 10,361 4,287 0.71 0.94 41,261 
South Dakota  45,043 0.61 857 10,389 4,308 0.71 0.94 41,265 
Texas  46,757 0.61 871 10,611 4,474 0.73 0.95 41,341 
North Carolina  46,973 0.61 873 10,638 4,495 0.73 0.95 41,344 
New York  52,799 0.60 918 11,365 5,058 0.80 0.99 41,573 
Indiana  52,962 0.60 919 11,386 5,074 0.80 0.99 41,592 
Washington  53,153 0.60 920 11,408 5,093 0.81 0.99 41,588 
Colorado  53,632 0.60 923 11,467 5,139 0.81 0.99 41,617 
California  53,807 0.59 925 11,487 5,156 0.81 0.99 41,612 
U.S. 51,518 0.60 909   11,209  4,934 0.79 0.98 41,526 
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to improve the economic development of the states. Borjas and Ramsey (1995) 
provide estimating return wage differential among college graduates and high school 
graduate for the 44 metropolitan areas. Averaging log wage differential into the state 
levels, we have 0.47 for California, 0.5 for Florida, 0.42 for North Carolina, and 0.46 
for Texas. In U.S., college graduates earned 46.6 percent more than high school 
graduates. Since the annual wage income of high school graduate was $34,260, we 
have $49,970 for the wage of college graduates. There are two ways to do the 
comparative statics of return function. One way is to change the wage of high school 
graduates. The other way is to have a change in the constant term in the Cobb-
Douglas return function which implies a change in wage return of college graduates, 
but no change in the wages of the high school graduates.  
In Table VIII, we show the effect of a change in the wage of high school  
Table VIII. Change in Reservation Wage Income: Uniform Distribution 
Reservation 
Wage  
am h e t t/s q r 
30,000 0.49 1,212 10,739 4,905 0.84 0.93 36,188 
31,000 0.52 1,173 10,839 4,909 0.83 0.94 37,426 
32,000 0.54 1,132 10,938 4,913 0.82 0.95 38,653 
33,000 0.57 1,087 11,040 4,917 0.80 0.96 39,917 
34,000 0.59 1,041 11,139 4,922 0.79 0.97 41,147 
35,000 0.62 990 11,242 4,926 0.78 0.99 42,415 
36,000 0.64 938 11,344 4,932 0.77 1.00 43,673 
37,000 0.67 883 11,446 4,937 0.76 1.01 44,922 
38,000 0.69 826 11,549 4,943 0.75 1.02 46,186 
39,000 0.72 764 11,653 4,948 0.74 1.03 47,465 
40,000 0.75 699 11,761 4,955 0.73 1.04 48,784 
41,000 0.78 634 11,863 4,961 0.72 1.06 50,024 
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graduates. As reservation wage increases, the option of college attendance becomes 
less attractive so that the marginal ability will increase. With an increase in the 
marginal ability, we know that from state optimization, expenditure rises, head tax 
decreases, and tuition increases, except much lower marginal ability. Note that 
subsidy increases, because the number effect dominates the tax effect. Therefore, 
tuition/subsidy ratio increases. Because of both higher marginal ability and more 
expenditure, quality of university increases, as shown in Table VIII. The second way 
to apply wage differential to our model is to change the constant term. In Table IX, 
we show the effect of change in reservation wage on the equilibrium. As reservation 
wage increases, the college education becomes more attractive so that more students 
will attend the university, because the less ability student will become marginal 
Table IX. Change in Q: Uniform Distribution 
Q am h e t t/s q r 
5 0.84  305 8,032  3,335  0.71  0.85  42,208  
5.1 0.81  363  8,065  3,331  0.70  0.85  42,100  
5.2 0.79  419  8,099  3,328  0.70  0.84  41,997  
5.3 0.76  474  8,133  3,324  0.69  0.84  41,883  
5.4 0.73  527  8,167  3,321  0.69  0.84  41,780  
5.5 0.71  578  8,203  3,317  0.68  0.83  41,693  
5.6 0.69  627  8,239  3,314  0.67  0.83  41,605  
5.7 0.67  676  8,276  3,311  0.67  0.83  41,517  
5.8 0.65  723  8,313  3,308  0.66  0.83  41,433  
5.9 0.63  769  8,349  3,305  0.66  0.83  41,331  
6 0.61  814  8,387  3,302  0.65  0.82  41,261  
6.1 0.59  858  8,425  3,299  0.64  0.82  41,179  
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student. Unlike change in reservation wage income, the change in the 
reservation wage affects state government directly. In (3.9), we know that aggregate 
marginal gain from expenditure will increase. Therefore, the government will 
increase educational expenditure. Given marginal ability, for the state government 
optimization, we know that the ELe shifts upward, but the ELh does not shift. 
Therefore, as the reservation wage increases, we observe that both expenditure and 
head tax increase. From Table IX, we observe that tuition will decrease, because 
otherwise less able student will not attend the university, even though the return to 
education gives some incentive to attend the university. As we can see from Table IX, 
the return from college education for the marginal ability student becomes less as the 
reservation wage increases. Even though it is not easy for us to quantify political 
weight, we can investigate the role of political considerations on the optimal choice 
of funding instruments. In Table X, we report the effect of an increase in the political  
Table X. Change in w: Uniform Distribution 
w am h e t t/s q r 
0.90 0.73 144  11,053  9,761  7.55  1.00  47,103  
0.91 0.70 280  11,081  8,808  3.88  1.00  45,924  
0.92 0.67 437  11,107  7,846  2.41  0.99  44,796  
0.93 0.65 614  11,132  6,877  1.62  0.99  43,696  
0.94 0.62 810  11,152  5,902  1.12  0.98  42,602  
0.95 0.60 1,025  11,171  4,923  0.79  0.98  41,538  
0.96 0.58 1,258  11,186  3,940  0.54  0.97  40,480  
0.97 0.55 1,506  11,202  2,956  0.36  0.97  39,480  
0.98 0.53 1,771  11,211  1,970  0.21  0.96  38,438  
0.99 0.51 2,050  11,222  984  0.10  0.96  37,455  
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weight. When w increases, the state government values those enrolled households 
relatively more than the non-enrolled households. Therefore, tuition decreases and 
tax increases so that tuition/subsidy ratio decreases. More students are enrolled at the 
university in equilibrium.    
So far, we assume that the ability distribution is uniform. With a beta 
distribution of students’ ability, we investigate the effect of change in income. As 
explained before, using PSAT score distribution of U.S., we investigate the effect of 
an increase in the median income in Table XI.  Given the same median income, 
change in distribution of students’ abilities from uniform distribution to beta 
distribution brings higher marginal ability, because the average student ability 
increases less in the beta distribution than the uniform distribution. For the state 
government’s optimization, because of beta distribution, the aggregate marginal gain 
from expenditure will be smaller than the uniform distribution. Therefore, the 
educational expenditure is in this beta distribution case is smaller than the head tax in 
Table XI. Change in Income: Beta Distribution 
States Income Level am h e t t/s q r 
Oklahoma 43,138 0.63 158 9,653 4,191 0.77 0.84 40,337 
Florida 44,829 0.63 168 9,850 4,354 0.79 0.85 40,395 
South Dakota 45,043 0.63 168 9,877 4,375 0.80 0.85 40,422 
Texas 46,757 0.63 178 10,076 4,541 0.82 0.86 40,474 
North Carolina 46,973 0.63 180 10,096 4,562 0.82 0.86 40,474 
New York 52,799 0.62 210 10,740 5,127 0.91 0.89 40,681 
Indiana 52,962 0.62 211 10,760 5,143 0.92 0.89 40,699 
Washington 53,153 0.62 212 10,779 5,162 0.92 0.89 40,693 
Colorado 53,632 0.62 214 10,831 5,208 0.93 0.89 40,716 
California 53,807 0.62 216 10,848 5,225 0.93 0.89 40,708 
U.S. 51,518 0.62 203.11 10,603 5,003 0.89 0.88 40,649 
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Table VIII. To the opposite, tuition will be higher than the uniform distribution. 
Therefore, tuition/subsidy is bigger than the uniform distribution. Given the beta 
distribution, the effect of an increase in income on marginal ability, expenditure, 
head tax, tuition, tuition/subsidy ratio, and quality of university is similarly explained 
as the uniform distribution.  
From our simulation, we learn that differences in median income can explain 
why we have differences in the mix of funding. The higher median income will bring 
higher tuition/subsidy ratio and higher university quality. The wage differential 
between college graduates and high school graduates also explain the differences in 
the mix of funding. Tuition/subsidy ratio is higher with the bigger wage differential. 
Different political weight of state government can explain the mix of funding in 
public higher education. The higher political weight on the college enrollees results 
in the lower tuition/subsidy ratio. Different distribution of students’ abilities also 
explains the mix of funding across states. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
McPherson and Schapiro (2003) point out that over the past 60 years user 
charge finance has gradually replaced tax financing in higher education. Furthermore, 
we observe more divergence in the relative usage of user charge to tax finance across 
states. Still, the between-states inequality dominates the within-state inequality in 
terms of tuition/ subsidy ratio. This dissertation has tried to give a theoretical 
foundation for the relative use of general state subsidies (tax finance) and tuition 
(user charge finance) in the state financing of higher education. As mentioned in the 
literature review in Chapter I, there are few articles dealing with the simultaneous use 
of both methods of financing methods. We develop a model which yields the mixed 
financing methods in the equilibrium public finance of a private good. Another 
contribution is to study the comparative statics of the model. Both analytical and 
numerical simulation comparative statics results were obtained. 
 In this study, we only consider the State Regime in which the state 
government chooses tuition, tax, and expenditure and the state university simply is 
treated as a passive agent. The state government is assumed to take the marginal 
student ability as given. Therefore, the model resembles the competitive market 
analysis. The households who have a child decide whether or not to enroll their 
children at the university, taking head tax, tuition, and quality of university as given. 
In the household equilibrium, their perceived quality of university is equal to the 
actual quality of university.  
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The first first-order condition for the state government’s optimization shows 
how to redistribute the income among the types of households. The second first-order 
condition deals with the allocation problem in the economy. Note that holding tax 
constant, a change in tuition is equivalent to change in expenditure by the state 
budget constraint. The state government affects the public good, i.e. the quality of the 
university, directly. The solution to the allocation problem leads to a modified 
Samuelson condition.  
Combining the two first-order conditions, we show that under certain 
conditions, we have an interior solution of both head tax and expenditure. We then 
derive the effect of change in political weight and in median income on head tax, 
tuition, and expenditure. Since it is impossible for us to do more comparative statics, 
in Chapter III, we use a simulation method to derive our comparative statics. Using a 
uniform distribution of students’ abilities, we study the effect of an increase in 
income, the effect of a change in wage differential between college graduates and 
high school graduates, and the effect of a change in political weight. As the median 
income rises, both tuition/subsidy ratio and university quality increase, and marginal 
ability decreases. As college wage differential increases, tuition/subsidy ratio, 
university quality, and marginal ability decrease. As the state government views 
those enrolled-households more importantly than those non-enrolled households, 
tuition/subsidy ratio, university quality, and marginal ability decrease. 
For empirical work on higher education funding, our model suggests that a 
simultaneous equation model is required. Holding expenditure constant, Lowry 
(2001) estimates a system of four equations: state appropriation, tuition, spending on 
research, and spending on public service. Using 428 public universities in all 50 
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states, interestingly, Lowry (2001) tries to test for the effect of differences in 
financial autonomy of universities. We have several hypotheses from our theory. One 
of the hypotheses is that an increase in the median income raises tuition/subsidy ratio, 
but (almost) no change in quality of university. That is, recession may bring a 
financial stress for the university, but no decrease in quality of university.  
Furthermore, when the households expect that college wage differential between 
college graduates and high school graduates increases, we predict that expenditure 
increases, tuition decreases, and tuition/subsidy ratio decreases. 
Theoretically, in our future research we may allow income to be 
heterogeneous in order to find out the effect of change in income distribution on our 
endogenous variables. Since we assume that the state government takes the minimum 
ability as given, we may expand our model so that it allows the government to know 
the household demand curve for entry. In this case, the government will decide head 
tax, tuition, and expenditure subject to the additional marginal household behavioral 
constraint. Note that the state government has to consider how many households will 
send their children to the university when it decides its choice variables.  
Finally, we consider only the State Regime in which state government 
decides everything and the public university is passive. We can consider the 
University Regime in which state government decides head tax, and the public 
university decides user charge and expenditure. We may view the university as 
quality maximizing institution following Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2001). We have 
to develop the game theoretical model in order to consider the strategic interaction 
between state government and university. 
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APPENDIX 
GAUSS PROGRAM FOR SIMULAION 
 
output file=c:\Gauss4.0\Simul\kimout  reset; 
format /m1/rd 15,12; 
 
alpha=0.5; beta=0.5; 
lambda=0.4; kappa=1-lambda; 
gam=0.4; delta=1-gam; 
mu=5.7; 
r0=3.43; 
w=0.95; 
 
om=w^(1/(1-beta)); 
sig=alpha*kappa*gam; 
nu=alpha*lambda*gam; 
ad=alpha*delta; 
 
TN=105480101; 
N1=38022115; 
nn1=TN/N1; 
ncase=1;  
na=2000; achng=0.99/(na-1); 
a=seqa(0, achng,na); 
ncase=11; 
emat=zeros(na,ncase);hmat=emat;tmat=emat;am_mat=emat;tsr=emat;subs=ematt; 
 
/***Income Change***/ 
vecy={4.3138, 4.4829, 4.5043,4.6757,4.6973,5.2799,5.2962,5.3153,5.3632,5.3807,5.1518}; 
lcase=1; do while lcase<=ncase; 
y=vecy[lcase]; 
 
 
/***Uniform Distriubtion Function***/ 
@p=1;q;@ 
 
/****Beta Distribution Function***/ 
x=0.483; 
s=0.105; 
q=(1-x)*(x*(1-x)/s^2-1); 
p=x*(x*(1-x)/s^2-1); 
 
proc g(a); 
retp(a^(p-1).*(1-a)^(q-1)); 
endp; 
 
x1=1|0; 
B=intquad1(&g,x1); 
 
fa = N1/B*a^(p-1).*(1-a)^(q-1); 
 
Famc=zeros(na,1); 
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i=1; do while i<=na; 
 am=a[i]; 
    x2=am|0; 
        Famc[i] =N1/B*intquad1(&g,x2);   
 i=i+1; 
endo; 
 
avg=zeros(na,1); 
i=1;do while i<=na; 
 am=a[i]; 
    N11=N1-Famc[i]; 
    x3=1|a[i]; 
    temp1=intquad1(&u,x3); 
 avar=(1/N11)*temp1; 
    avg[i,1]=avar; 
i=i+1; 
endo; 
 
 
proc u(x); 
retp(N1/B*x^p.*(1-x)^(q-1)); 
endp; 
 
proc v(x); 
retp(N1/B*x^(p+ad-1).*(1-x)^(q-1)); 
endp; 
 
iam=1; do while iam<=na; 
    am=a[iam]; 
    N11=N1-Famc[iam]; 
    x4=1|a[iam]; 
    temp2=intquad1(&v,x4); 
    temp3=mu^alpha*avg[iam]^nu*sig*temp2; 
    temp4=beta*N11; 
    tau = (temp3 ./ temp4)^(1/(beta-1)); 
    theta=TN/N11; 
 
/* Finding the Optimal Values for State Government */ 
x1=0; x2=y; 
tol  = 1e-5 ; 
maxit=20; 
 
fmid=(om+theta-1).*tau.*x2^((1-sig)/(1-beta)) + om*x2 - theta*om*y; 
f=(om+theta-1).*tau.*x1^((1-sig)/(1-beta)) + om*x1 - theta*om*y; 
 
if (f*fmid .ge 0); print " root is outside of the boundary"; goto return1; endif; 
rtbis=x1; dx=x2-x1; 
 
j=1; do while j<=maxit; 
dx=dx*0.5; 
xmid=rtbis+dx; 
fmid=(om+theta-1).*tau.*xmid^((1-sig)/(1-beta)) + om*xmid+om-theta*om*y; 
if (fmid .le 0.0); rtbis=xmid; endif; 
if(abs(dx) .lt tol); goto return1; endif; 
j=j+1; endo; 
 
return1: 
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emat[iam,lcase]=xmid; 
temp5=(xmid-(1-om)*y)/(om+theta-1); 
if temp5<0; hmat[iam,lcase]=0; else; hmat[iam,lcase]=temp5; endif; 
tmat[iam,lcase]=emat[iam,lcase]-theta*hmat[iam,lcase]; 
 
/* Finding Households' Equilbirum:am value*/ 
z1=0; z2=1; 
rtbis2=z1; dz=z2-z1; 
 
j=1; do while j<=maxit; 
dz=dz*0.5; 
zmid=rtbis2+dz; 
N11=N1-Famc[j]; 
temp6=(avg[j])^nu*(zmid)^ad; 
temp7=((y-hmat[iam,lcase])^beta+r0^alpha-(y-hmat[iam,lcase]-
tmat[iam,lcase])^beta)/(mu^alpha*emat[iam,lcase]^sig); 
fmid=temp6-temp7; 
if (fmid .le 0.0); rtbis2=zmid; endif; 
if(abs(dz) .lt tol); goto return2; endif; 
j=j+1; endo; 
 
return2: 
am_mat[iam,lcase]=zmid; 
 
iam=iam+1; endo; 
 
/***Finding Overall Equilibrium***/ 
 
tol2=1e-3; 
 
i=1; do while i<=na; 
am_gap=a[i]-am_mat[i,lcase]; 
if(abs(am_gap) .lt tol2); goto return3; endif; 
i=i+1; endo; 
 
return3: 
am_e=a[i]; 
h_e=hmat[i,lcase]; 
e_e=emat[i,lcase]; 
t_e=tmat[i,lcase]; 
N11=N1-Famc[i]; 
q_e=(avg[i])^lambda*e_e^kappa; 
r_e=mu*(q_e)^gam*(am_e)^delta; 
s_e=TN/N11*h_e; 
tsr=t_e/s_e; 
 
print am_e~h_e~e_e~t_e~tsr~q_e~r_e;  
 
lcase=lcase+1; endo; 
end; 
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